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Ndo Vale a Pena? (Not Worth the




In September 2005, Brazilian public prosecutors filed a series of
lawsuits that would have been nearly unimaginable in the country
even a few years before. The suits, brought in Brasilia as civil
complaints in the federal labor courts, charged five of the country's
leading banks with violating the Brazilian constitution by
discriminating against Afro-Brazilian employees and job applicants in
hiring, promotion and compensation! The allegations were based on
statistical evidence indicating significant disparities in occupational
status and compensation of Afro-Brazilian employees relative to their
white colleagues at the banks.2 The suits also asserted that the banks
discriminated in hiring, based on under-representation of Afro-
Brazilians in the banks' workforce when compared to their share of
the local labor market In the first of these cases to be heard in court,
the judge observed that these statistics provided "vehement
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for the Ninth Circuit, 2007-2008 term; Associate James and Hoffman, P.C., 2006-
2007; J.D. Yale Law School, 2006. Many thanks to Owen Fiss, Neide Aparecida
Fonseca, Mariana Mota Prado, Payal Sampat, Veronica Santarosa and Marcos Paulo
Verfssimo, for their kind assistance, wise counsel and endless patience. The research
upon which this article is based was supported by a Foreign Language and Area
Studies fellowship from Yale Law School and the Yale Council on International and
Area Studies.
1. Press Release, Ministdrio Pdblico do Trabalho, Eliminaqdo da discriminaqao
no trabalho (Sept. 12, 2005), <http://www.mpt.gov.br/>, (visited May 2, 2007)
(Brazil).
2. Press Release, Ministdrio Ptiblico do Trabalho, Combate A discriminaq~o no
trabalho (May 23, 2005), <http://www.mpt.gov.br/> (visited Apr. 2, 2007) (Brazil).
3. Id.
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indications of discrimination in the employment policies practiced by
the defendant bank."4 Public prosecutors announced that they would
be bringing similar litigation in five other states, as part of a broader
initiative to tackle discrimination in the banking industry
In almost every significant aspect, these lawsuits represented a
dramatic break with the traditional treatment of racial discrimination
claims in Brazilian courts. Up until the mid-1990s public prosecutors
considered protection of minority rights at the bottom of their list of
law enforcement priorities.6 Brazil's statutory anti-discrimination law
was comprised of a single provision of the penal code prohibiting acts
"motivated by racial prejudice."7 Brazilian courts held that liability
for racial discrimination could only be established through direct
evidence of a defendant's prejudicial motive! Instances of Afro-
Brazilian workers successfully challenging racial discrimination
through the court system were so rare that a 1997 documentary film
chronicling a case where a plaintiff actually prevailed was entitled
"The Exception and the Rule."
9
The recent employment discrimination suits brought against the
banks on behalf of Afro-Brazilian workers also reflect a broader shift
in the country's treatment of racial inequality. For most of the last
century the Brazilian state claimed that it was a 'racial democracy'
whose colorblind society stood in contrast to the segregationist
practices of other nations, a claim that was accepted by numerous
scholars, Brazilian and foreign.1" By the century's end, however, both
scholars and state officials increasingly recognized that despite
longstanding traditions of formal legal equality and widespread
interracial mixing, Brazilian racial relations were characterized by
deep and persistent inequalities between the white and non-white
4. Press Release, Minist~rio Ptiblico do Trabalho, Combate A discriminaq~o no
trabalho (Dec. 13, 2005), <http://www.mpt.gov.br/> (visited Apr. 2, 2007) (Brazil).
5. Press Release, Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, TST Felicita MPT por
programa de promoqAo de igualdade, (April 20, 2005), <http://www.tst.gov.br/>
(visited Apr. 2, 2007) (Brazil).
6. INSTITUTO DE ESTUDos ECONOMICOS, SOCIAIS, E POLITIcOS DE SAO PAULO,
0 MINISTtRIO POBLICO E A JUSTIQA NO BRASIL 15 (1996) [hereinafter "IDESP"].
7. Lei No. 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989 D.O. (Brazil) (translation by author)
[hereinafter Lei 7.716/89].
8. Seth Racusen, "A Mulato Cannot be Prejudiced: The Legal Construction of
Racial Discrimination in Contemporary Brazil" 93 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (copy on file with Yale Law Library).
9. The Exception and the Rule (Tapiri Video 1997), cited in Racusen, supra note
8, at 306.
10. Edward Telles, RACE IN ANOTHER AMERICA 39-46 (2004).
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populations." In place of the claim that Brazil was a racial democracy
came a realization that in areas such as formal employment and
higher education, the exclusion of persons of African descent - a
group that is generally understood to include more than 40 percent of
the country's population - rivaled that of countries such as South
Africa and the United States, that have only recently emerged from
decades of legally-enforced apartheid.
12
Over the past 10 years the country's government, under pressure
from Afro-Brazilian activists, has introduced a wave of affirmative
action programs in higher education and public sector employment. 3
However, until the filing of last summer's lawsuits, the issue of
widespread discrimination against Afro-Brazilians in the country's
private labor market remained largely untouched by these
developments, and in particular, by any challenge brought through
the country's courts. This paper considers why, despite the recent
success of Afro-Brazilians in mobilizing the state to address the issue
of racial inequality, there has been - until now - remarkably little
use of the legal system to combat racial discrimination in the
workplace.
The seeming absence of legal action against racial discrimination
is all the more notable given that "the practice of racism" was made a
crime in. Brazil in 1951, and the Constitution explicitly prohibits
differentiation based on color in hiring, salary and job functions.
14
This paper discusses the interaction and influence of three key factors
which impede use of the law challenging employment discrimination
against Afro-Brazilians: (1) Brazil's distinctive ideologies of race
relations; (2) its statutes and constitutional law dealing with
discrimination; and (3) the treatment of these issues by its legal
institutions. I assess the impact of these factors on the attractiveness
and effectiveness of legal action as a strategy for combating racial
discrimination in the country's labor markets. I conclude by
considering recent developments and potential reforms that may
make the law a more effective tool to be used on behalf of Afro-
Brazilian workers.
Section II summarizes the impact of racial discrimination on the
Brazilian labor market. This is important when discussing Brazilian
11. Id. at 47.
12. Id. at 111, 126, 131, 148.
13. Id. at 72.
14. Constituiqdo Federal [hereinafter C.F.] art. 7, T 30; Lei No. 1390, de 3 de
julho de 1951 [hereinafter Lei 1.390/51] (translation by author).
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anti-discrimination law because the ideologies of race relations that
have shaped the law explicitly reject either the existence of significant
discrimination against Afro-Brazilians, or its salience for redressing
social inequality. These ideologies have influenced the Brazilian
judiciary and other legal institutions and thus have affected how the
anti-discrimination laws are applied. In this section, I draw on
economic and sociological research showing that Afro-Brazilians
experience a degree of inequality in relation to whites which cannot
be explained without recognition of widespread racial discrimination
in Brazil's labor market. I also illustrate, through the observations of
legal practitioners and scholars, the impact of racial discrimination on
the working lives of Afro-Brazilians. I conclude that racial
discrimination is pervasive in the country's labor market and affects
Afro-Brazilian workers at each stage of employment.
Next, I consider two ideologies of race relations that have
influenced the development of Brazilian anti-discrimination law.
First, I analyze the historically dominant notion that Brazil is an
egalitarian "racial democracy." Second, I explore the currently more
prevalent view that racial inequality exists in Brazil, but is a symptom
of class divisions - not prejudice - and is best addressed through
redistributionist social policies. I show how these two ideologies have
shaped the development of the country's anti-discrimination law and
conclude that their combined impact has been quite significant. The
first ideology, racial democracy, has both disadvantaged Afro-
Brazilians' attempts to challenge discrimination in the courts and
handicapped their collective efforts to develop a broad-based social
movement for racial equality. The second ideology, which I term the
"class-over-race" thesis further hobbles Afro-Brazilians' efforts to
eliminate racial discrimination by encouraging the subordination of
race-conscious initiatives within class-based politics focusing on
economic development and wealth redistribution.
In Section III, I consider the direct impact of Brazilian anti-
discrimination law on the ability of Afro-Brazilians to challenge racial
inequality through the courts. In particular, I examine the interplay
between the ideology of racial democracy and the Brazilian legal
system's conception of racial discrimination as a criminal offense
manifested in open acts of prejudice. The adoption of a penal
approach to the issue of racism has resulted in an anti-discrimination
law that is remarkably "thin," and fails to address all but the most
blatant offenses. I examine the ways in which this basic formulation
of what racial discrimination is, and how it should be remedied, has
[Vol. 30:3
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influenced the development of the country's anti-discrimination law.
I conclude that it has produced a legal regime that is of little value for
countering discrimination against Afro-Brazilian workers.
In Section IV, I consider what has been, until the last decade, a
path not taken by Afro-Brazilians - the route of challenging racial
discrimination in the workplace through civil lawsuits rather than
criminal prosecution. I discuss three related aspects of Brazil's civil
litigation system that may provide significant advantages over
reliance on the anti-discrimination provisions of the penal code. I
look at the viability of bringing suit based directly on constitutional
guarantees of equal treatment in the workplace. I also examine the
option of bringing racial discrimination claims under the country's
labor code, an area of Brazilian law that is far more developed than
the anti-discrimination statutes." Lastly, I consider the potential for
bringing such claims as class actions, a procedural device which Brazil
has already adopted.16 In each area there are significant obstacles to
effective use of the law, however, civil litigation offers a far more
promising path than continued reliance on criminal law.
In Section V, I compare the response of Brazil's judiciary, public
prosecutors, police forces and private bar to the issue of racial
discrimination with that of political actors in the executive and
legislative branches. Despite some signs of change, Brazilian judges
and attorneys, compared to members of the executive and legislature,
may be more wedded to the ideology of racial democracy and less
responsive to the problem of discrimination against Afro-Brazilians. 7
Similarly, while some attempts at reform are underway, the police,
through whom citizens must channel criminal complaints under the
anti-discrimination laws, are often perceived as being hostile and
prejudicial towards Afro-Brazilians."8  Likewise, until recently,
Brazilian prosecutors responsible for litigating criminal cases and the
vast majority of class actions, gave little attention to the issue of racial
15. John D. French, DROWNING IN LAWS: LABOR LAW AND BRAZILIAN
POLITICAL CULTURE 1, 40 (U.N.C. Press 2004) [hereinafter DROWNING IN LAWS].
16. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil - A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 311 (2003).
17. Antonio Guimardes, The Misadventures of Nonracialism in Brazil, in
BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND EQUALITY IN BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE
UNITED STATES 174 (Charles Hamilton et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter BEYOND
RACISM].
18. Racusen, supra note 8, at 20; Stephen Buckley, Brazil's Racial Awakening;
Multihued Nation Takes a New Look at Prejudice and Inequities, WASH. POST, June
12, 2000, at A12.
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discrimination.19  However, in the past several years, public
prosecutors, particularly those assigned to the country's labor courts,
have begun to place greater emphasis on enforcing the anti-
discrimination laws.
Finally, in Section VI, I examine another factor cited by both
Brazilian and foreign observers to explain the legal system's failure to
address effectively racial discrimination has been the inadequate
performance in this area of its key institutional actors, including
judges, public prosecutors, police and the private bar.
Since Brazil's return to democracy in the 1980s, however, other
political institutions have undergone a much more rapid and dramatic
shift in their treatment of racial issues. Through both "entrist"
strategies of gaining influence within the country's political parties,
and external critiques of the government brought before various
international fora, Afro-Brazilian activists have achieved impressive
success in pushing the country's executive and legislature to adopt
meaningful measures to address racial inequality.' Thus it is not
surprising that Brazil's Movimento Negro 2' has chosen to advance its
claims before these institutions rather than on the less friendly terrain
of the courts. I suggest that this strategy, while quite successful in
prodding these branches to address the issue of racial inequality, may
have further delayed the development of effective legal tools against
racial discrimination in the workplace.
While this paper takes a highly critical view of the Brazilian legal
system's past treatment of the problem of discrimination against
Afro-Brazilian workers, it concludes by recognizing that recent
developments suggest that real change may be afoot in this area of
19. IDESP, supra note 6, at 15; Maria Tereza Sadek and Rosangela Batista
Cavalcanti, The New Public Prosecution and the Efficacy of Accountability
Mechanisms, 5 n.7, Paper Presented for the Conference, "Political Institutions,
Accountability, and Democratic Governance in Latin America," Notre Dame
University, May 8-9, 2000, available at http://kellogg.nd.edu/events/pdfs/Sadek.pdf,
(citing Ronaldo Macedo, A Evolugdo Institucional do Minist6rio Pdblico in Uma
Introduqdo ao Estudo da Justiqa 42 (Maria Tereza Sadek, ed. 1996)).
20. Telles, supra note 10, at 48-51, 63-71.
21. Literally, "Black Movement." I use this term in its current Brazilian
meaning as referring collectively to the activists and organizations that make up the
Afro-Brazilian civil rights movement. It is derived from the name of the umbrella
organization, Movimento Negro Unificado, (Unified Black Movement) whose
founding in 1978 marked the emergence of Afro-Brazilian political mobilization
during the country's period of democratic transition. See Ldlia Gonzales, The
Unified Black Movement: A New Stage in Black Political Mobilization in RACE,
CLASS AND POWER IN BRAZIL 124 (Pierre-Michel Fontaine ed., 1985).
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law. The myth of racial democracy has been steadily discredited in
Brazil over the past two decades,22 opening the door for lawmakers,
legal scholars and practitioners to reconceptualize how discrimination
is defined under the law and redressed through the courts. Legal
advocates for racial equality have already begun to shift their
approach from reliance on criminal prosecution to the more
promising route of civil litigation, and recent amendments to the
labor law and civil code further have made this alternative even more
attractive. Though grounds for optimism are still sparsest in the
jurisprudence of the courts themselves, recent decisions in favor of
Afro-Brazilian plaintiffs in the country's labor courts, and the
increasing energy and creativity shown by public prosecutors in
bringing litigation there suggest that this new strategy may be opening
a new chapter in the story of Brazilian anti-discrimination law. I
conclude by identifying a few areas where the existing law,
particularly class action procedure, may be amended to further
facilitate such efforts.
H. The Impact of Employment Discrimination on
Afro-Brazilian Workers
A. Race and Inequality
In the area of employment, one cites numbers that would
embarrass the normal North American citizen, but that in Brazil do
not cause the least impact. We have for example, nearly 800
federal judges. Of these, blacks hardly make up a dozen. The
Federal Public Ministry has nearly 550 prosecutors among whom
only six are black; the Diplomatic Corps, the most racist of
Brazilian institutions, does not count more than two blacks in a
group of nearly one thousand diplomats; in the Brazilian public
universities, above all in their most prestigious programs, not more
than 3 percent of the students are black, an absurdity in a country
in the black population is more than 40 percent of the total. 3
So observed Joaquim Barbosa Gomes, who in 2003 became the
first Afro-Brazilian named to the Federal Supreme Court.24  As
22. Id. at 10; Buckley, supra note 18, at A12.
23. Joaquim Barbosa Gomes, 0 Uso da Lei no Combate ao Racismo: Direitos
Difusos e as Ac~es Civis Ptiblicas, in TIRANDO A MASCARA: ENSAIOS SOBRE 0
RACISMO NO BRASIL 408 n.15 (Antonio S.A. Guimardes and Lynn Huntley eds.,
2000) (translation by author) [hereinafter TIRANDO A MASCARA].
24. Telles, supra note 10, at 74.
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Gomes suggests, among the most striking aspects of racial inequality
in Brazil are both the near absence of Afro-Brazilians in the upper
reaches of professional life, and the fact that this occurs in a country
with 100 million persons of African descent, more than live any other
nation in the world except Nigeria." When asked to indicate their
skin color on an open scale, roughly 53 percent of Brazilians use a
term designating some shade of black or brown compared to 42
percent who refer to themselves as white.26 Using U.S. terms of racial
classification, Brazil is a majority black nation.
Even though Brazil was the last country in the Americas to
abolish slavery, until recently, leading Brazilian legal scholars, like
much of the country's elite, maintained that due to the mixed identity
of much of the population, significant racial discrimination simply did
not exist in Brazilian society.27 Writing in 1989, constitutional law
scholars Celso Ribeiro Bastos and Ives Gandra Martins asserted that
while "[tihe black population.., presents an economic and social
underclass when compared with the average of the Brazilian
population," racial discrimination could not be the cause because "the
majority of the Brazilian population is mixed, and the foundation of
racism depends necessarily on the existence of races that oppose and
distinguish each other."' In regard to racial bias in the labor market,
they commented, "discriminatory practices on the part of the
employer, notably in reference to the hiring of the employee.., by
color is fortunately not significant in our country.,
29
In Brazil, racial inequality is felt both in the absence of Afro-
Brazilians in the upper echelons of society and in the much higher
incidence of poverty in the non-white population. However,
economic and sociological research indicates that racial
discrimination in the labor market is a key factor in maintaining this
inequality." In this section I briefly sketch the dimensions of racial
25. Id. at 7, 110; Ricardo Rochetti, Not as Easy as Black and White: The
Implications of the University of Rio de Janeiro's Quota-Based Admissions Policy on
Affirmative Action Law in Brazil, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1423, 1425 (2004).
26. Telles, supra note 10, at 91.
27. Id. at 43; Guimaraes, supra note 17, at 174.
28. 2 Celso Ribeiro Bastos and Ives Gandra Martins, COMENTARIOS A
CONSTITUIQAO DO BRASIL 221 (1989) (translation by author).
29. Id. at 496.
30. Telles, supra note 10, at 16, 141; Nelson do Valle Silva, Updating the Cost of
Not Being White, in RACE, CLASS AND POWER IN BRAZIL 54 (Pierre-Michel Fontaine,
ed., 1985); Edna Maria Santos Roland, The Economics of Racism: People of African
Descent in Brazil, Paper Delivered at the Seminar on the Economics of Racism,
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inequality in Brazil and its relationship to labor market discrimination
against Afro-Brazilian workers. I also will discuss the other source of
Justice Gomes' frustration - the failure of the Brazilian legal system
to respond to this deep and debilitating divide.
Despite being the world's ninth largest national economy, Brazil
has the most unequal distribution of wealth of any country outside
sub-Saharan Africa.3 Income inequality in Brazil has grown in the
last four decades, with the share of wealth distributed to the poorer
half of the population falling from 18 percent to 11 percent, and that
accruing to the richest 20 percent rising from 54 percent to 64
percent.2 While Brazil has a sizeable poor white population, wealth
and poverty are strongly correlated with skin color: "poverty in Brazil
unquestionably has a racial identity. It is mainly non-white., 33 A 1989
study showed that non-white Brazilians are 3.5 times more likely than
whites to be poor, while white Brazilians are five times more likely
than non-whites to belong in the top income brackets.34 Average
annual family incomes of black and brown Brazilians are respectively,
40 percent and 45 percent those of white families.35 Ninety percent of
all black and brown Brazilians live beneath the poverty line; though
so do nearly 50 percent of all whites. 6 To speak of poverty in Brazil
without regard to race ignores the reality that while "a part of the
white population is poor; all of the black population is poor.,
37
B. Race and Labor Market Discrimination
This unequal distribution of income reflects a wide disparity in
wages between non-white and white workers. In 1996, the Brazilian
government estimated that black women earned a mere 25 percent of
the average wage of white male workers and black men earned only
International Council on Human Rights Policy 6-7 (Nov. 24-25, 2001), available at
http://www.falapreta.org.br/durban/racism.doc.
31. U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural liberty in
today's diverse world, 51-53 (2004), available at <http://hdr.undp.org/report/
global/2004/?CFID=927458&CFTOKEN=93750862>.
32. Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento, Dance of Deception: A
Reading of Race Relations in Brazil, in BEYOND RACISM, supra note 17, at 107.
33. Sueli Carneiro, The Myth of Racial Democracy, in COMPARING BRAZIL AND
SouTH AFRICA 179, 183 (Steven Friedman and Riaan de Villiers eds., 1996).
34. Telles, supra note 10, at 110.
35. Id. at 115.
36. George Fredrickson, Race and Racism in Historical Perspective: Comparing
the United States, South Africa and Brazil in Beyond Racism, supra note 17, at 13.
37. Carneiro, supra note 33, at 183.
2007]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
40 percent. 38 Surveys of unemployment in major cities in 1999 found
jobless rates of blacks to be anywhere from 17 percent to 45 percent
39higher than those of white workers in the same metropolitan areas.
These differences in earning power reflect stratification in
occupational status and differences in social mobility that divide the
fortunes of non-whites and whites. Black and brown Brazilians are
much more likely than whites to perform manual labor rather than
work in professional occupations.' Whites are fifteen times more
likely than blacks, and three times more likely than brown Brazilians,
to work in the highest occupational categories.
This racial divide is passed on and reinforced across generations.
Even accounting for parental income and education, rates of
intergenerational upward mobility for whites are higher than for
blacks at all points on the occupational ladder. 2 Moreover, for
higher-status blacks downward mobility in the next generation is
much more common than for similarly situated whites. 3
Brazilian elites traditionally have advanced a series of
explanations for these disparities that avoid the issue of racial
discrimination. Among these are the widespread poverty associated
with Brazil's status as a developing country, extreme differences in
rates of education between whites and non-whites, and class prejudice
that operate against the poor regardless of their race.' While these
factors can explain some, and in the case of access to education
perhaps most, of these differences, statistical evidence indicates that
racial discrimination in the labor market has a powerful impact on
Afro-Brazilian workers.
Brazilian scholars have estimated that while anywhere from two-
thirds to four-fifths of the disparities in occupational status and
earnings between whites and non-whites are due to differences in
education levels, the remaining portion of the disparity is attributable
38. REBECCA REICHMANN, RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL: FROM
INDIFFERENCE TO INEQUALITY 5, Introduction (Rebecca Reichmann, ed. 1999)
[hereinafter RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL].
39. Roland, supra note 30, at 4.
40. Telles, supra note 10, at 131.
41. Id.
42. Carlos Hasenbag, Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities in Brazil, in RACE,
CLASS AND POWER IN BRAZIL, supra note 30, at 32-6.
43. Id.
44. Antonio Guimaraes, CLASSES, RAqAS E DEMOCRACIA 63, 206 (2002);
Antonio Guimardes, RACISMO E ANTI-RACISMO NO BRASIL 206 (2002).
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to discrimination in the labor market. 5  Even at the same
occupational levels, black and brown Brazilians earn considerably less
than their white counterparts.4 Studies that control for education,
work experience and regional differences find that white workers
earn roughly a third more than their Afro-Brazilian counterparts - a
level of disparity three times greater than that between white and
black workers in the United States.47 While research indicates
differences in earnings for Afro-Brazilian men are "mainly due to
differences in human capital," such workers "also suffer heavy wage
and insertion [i.e., hiring] discrimination." 48 Afro-Brazilian women
experience even greater wage discrimination, and suffer an additional
degree of discrimination in hiring.
Studies over the last thirty years have shown that advancement in
education appears to widen the divide between Afro-Brazilian
workers and their white colleagues, since the latter receive greater
income gains from the same levels of schooling." A 1999 survey in
Sdo Paulo, Brazil's leading city of private industry and finance, found
that while Afro-Brazilians with a primary school education earned 84
percent of the wages of similarly educated white workers, those with
university degrees earned only 63.8 percent of the salaries of their
white colleagues." A separate study in 2000 concluded "[t]he better
positioned in the distribution of wealth, the more a black man is
discriminated against."52
C. Labor Market Discrimination in Everyday Life
The effects of racial discrimination in the labor market are highly
visible, though its actual workings are more covert. One commonly
cited example is the virtual absence of non-whites in retail sales and
other customer service positions.53 As Justice Marco Aurelio Mello,
President of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court has noted:
Visits to shopping malls reveal to us in everyday life that in the
45. Telles, supra note 10, at 141; do Valle Silva, supra note 30, at 54.
46. Telles, supra note 10, at 131.
47. Id. at 147; do Valle Silva, supra note 30, at 54.
48. Roland, supra note 30, at 6-7.
49. Id.
50. Hasenbalg, supra note 42, at 39.
51. Roland, supra note 30, at 5.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Joao Soares, Discriminaqdo no Emprego in DESAFIOS DO DIREITO DO
TRABALHO 78 (Jairo Sento-S6, ed. 2000).
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stores that sell sophisticated products blacks are rarely placed as
sales clerks, not to speak of managers. In restaurants, services that
involve direct contact with the customer generally are not done by
blacks. Moreover, where blacks are commonly present, they work
as manual laborers, bouncers, etc.4
Similarly, Sergio da Silva Martina writes that "[j]obs which involve
contact with the public or with clients - even if they do not require
special qualifications - are prohibited to the Black population," and
therefore that "Blacks are considered disqualified to exercise
positions such as secretaries, sales attendants in shopping malls, [or]
waiters in elegant restaurants...,"55 In the state of Bahia, where over
two-thirds of the population is of African descent, a study of private
petrochemical firms found that 83 percent of black female employees
worked as cleaners, while over 50 percent of white females at these
companies were employed as office staff.'
This segregation only increases further up the occupational
ladder, where Afro-Brazilians typically are denied positions that
involve interaction with top company officials or key clients. 7 A
recent survey of over a hundred of the country's largest enterprises
found that Afro-Brazilian employees made up only 2 percent of
middle and upper management - again, a striking statistic when one
realizes that they comprise nearly half the population.-
Other studies confirm that compared to Afro-Brazilians with the
same education and work experience; whites are hired into higher-
level positions and promoted faster within the corporate hierarchy.59
Afro-Brazilians who are placed in managerial positions often report
that white colleagues and subordinates consider them "arrogant,
aggressive invaders" and attempt to undermine them and provoke
54. Marco Atirelio Mendes de Farias Mello, 6 tica Constitucional - A Igualdade
e as Aq5es Afirmativas in DISCRIMINA( AO E SISTEMA LEGAL BRASILEIRO, 25
(Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, pubs. 2003) (translation by author) [hereinafter
DISCRIMINACAO E SISTEMA LEGAL].
55. S6rgio da Silva Martins, Direito e Combate a Discriminaqdo Racial no Brasil
in TIRANDO A MASCARA, supra note 23, at 423.
56. Nadya Aradjo Castro & Antonio S6rgio Alfredo Guimaraes, Racial
Inequalities in the Labor Market and the Workplace, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY
BRAZIL, supra note 38, at 89.
57. Id.
58. Humberto Adami, Representaqdo ao Ministgrio Ptiblico do Trabalho por
Deisgualdade Racial no Mercado de Trabalho: Urn Caminho a Ser Trilhado e
Observado, Jornal Irohin, 17-18 (Aug.-Sept. 2004), <http://www.Adami.adv.br/
imprensa.asp>.
59. Castro and Guimaraes, supra note 56, at 92-6.
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conflicts.' This results in a further reluctance of firms to employ
Afro-Brazilians in positions of authority."
Though racial discrimination in the workplace appears to be
heavily underreported by Afro-Brazilian workers,62 complaints are
sufficiently widespread to make clear the need for legal deterrence
and redress. Discrimination in the labor market is the form of racial
bias most widely reported by black and brown Brazilians.63 A 1995
survey found that 13 percent of black men and 19 percent of black
women say they have personally faced some form of employment
discrimination, with 7 percent of brown males and 5 percent of brown
women stating the same. 6 Though these figures seem quite low, even
if they accurately reflect reality, this would still mean that millions of
black and brown Brazilians claim to have personally suffered some
form of labor market discrimination.
Beyond the statistical evidence of income inequality and
occupational segregation, there is reason to believe that
discrimination is far more prevalent than these surveys suggest. In a
separate study, up to two-thirds of "black" Brazilians reported
experiencing some form of discrimination, with the percentage
reporting experiencing racial bias in hiring or promotion increasing
along with the occupational status of the worker.65 Moreover, a 2000
public opinion survey in Rio de Janeiro found that over 80 percent of
respondents agreed with the statement that, "discrimination keeps
blacks from getting good jobs and improving their lives." In other
words, when they are not asked to identify themselves as victims or
perpetrators of racial prejudice, Brazilians are quite open about the
existence of discrimination in the labor market.
Discrimination in hiring is the form of employment-related racial
bias most often complained of by Afro-Brazilians.67 Studies in Sao
Paulo show that when hiring decisions are made on criteria other than
60. Maria Aparecida Silva Bento, Diversidade nas Empresas in DISCRIMINAQAO
E SISTEMA LEGAL BRASILEIRO, supra note 54, at 44.
61. Soares, supra note 53, at 78.
62. See infra p. 2 77.
63. Racusen, supra note 8, at 176.
64. Nelson do Valle Silva, Some Basic Data on Racial Prejudice and Income
Differences in Brazil, in COMPARING BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 30, at
202.
65. John Burdick, The Lost Constituency of Brazil's Black Movements, 25 Latin
American Perspectives 136, 142 (1998).
66. Buckley, supra note 18, at A12.
67. Racusen, supra note 8, at 18.
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education and job experience, private firms often employ racial
stereotypes.' Where hiring is done through advertisements in
newspapers, discrimination often occurs through listings requiring
"boa aparencia" (literally "good appearance"), which is commonly
understood to exclude black candidates.69 Similarly, it appears that
employment agencies receive, and seek to satisfy, racial requirements
of their clients, by screening through identifying factors such as place
of residence.'
D. The Failure of Brazilian Anti-discrimination Law
Initially, we searched in the police stations and courts in Rio de
Janeiro - Nada! We went to the eminences of jurisprudence -
Nada! It was unbelievable that given so much fuss in the press
[about incidents of racial discrimination in Rio de Janeiro] there
were not even reports in the police stations - NadaP'
So Jorge da Silva described his 1994 survey of prosecutions under
Brazil's anti-discrimination laws. Searching in the Rio de Janeiro
courts for cases brought under Brazil's statutes prohibiting racial
discrimination 2 the 1951 Lei Afonso Arinos73 and its successor
legislation, the 1989 Lei Ca674 Silva found only four prosecutions, all
unsuccessful and none involving complaints against employers or co-
workers.75 While more recent studies have had more success finding
jurisprudence on this topic, they have sounded similar notes of
frustration regarding the laws' effectiveness. Civil rights lawyer
Hddio Silva has noted that during the first twenty-five years after the
enactment of the Lei Afonso Arinos, the courts in the states of Bahia,
68. Telles, supra note 10, at 160.
69. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Comparative Assessment of Racial Harassment
in the Americas, Paper delivered at 2004 AALS Labor Relations and Employment
Law Section Panel: Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law 12 (2004).
70. Racusen, supra note 8, at 191.
71. JORGE DA SILVA, DIREITOS CIVIS E RELA OES RACIAIS NO BRASIL 159
(1994) (translation by author).
72. As discussed infra, Brazil's core anti-discrimination law is a criminal statute,
which requires victims to file complaints with the police in order to initiate
investigation and prosecution.
73. Lei No. 1.390, de 3 de julho de 1951. This law is commonly referred to by the
name of its congressional sponsor, Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, as the "Lei
Afonso Arinos."
74. Lei No. 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989. Like its predecessor, the Lei Afonso
Arinos, this statute is referred to by the name of its congressional sponsor, in this
case, Deputy Carlos Alberto Ca6, as the "Lei Ca6."
75. Id. at 160.
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Rio Grande, Rio de Janeiro, and Sdo Paulo recorded only nine
convictions under the law.76 Similarly, S6rgio Martins found only two
convictions in all of Brazil under the Lei Ca6 from 1989 to 1999.
77
Seth Racusen, who has conducted what appears to be the most
comprehensive survey in this area, identified 142 cases dealing with
racial bias that were brought to trial in Brazilian courts between 1989
and 2001.71 While judges held defendants liable in thirty-five of these
cases, only six of them were convictions under the Lei Ca6, with the
rest involving violations of other statutes or constitutional
provisions.79 None of the cases where defendants were found liable
involved hiring and only two involved termination of employment.8
Thus, writes Carlos Medeiros, the courts have sent Afro-Brazilians an
"easily decipherable message: ... it is simply not worth the trouble
for blacks to pursue justice in cases of racial discrimination."81
The near-total failure of the Brazilian legal system in this area
leads one to the basic question posed by Ant6nio Guimardes: "Why
does racial discrimination still go widely unpunished in spite of [the
country] ... already having passed specific anti-discrimination
laws?"' As discussed herein, this is a question with multiple,
interrelated answers. It requires explanation of why the anti-
discrimination laws are so rarely used, and why they are used to such
little effect. This paper considers the various factors that may help
answer this question, including Brazilian ideologies of race relations,
the relative weakness of its anti-discrimination statutes, and the
treatment of racial issues by the judiciary and other legal institutions.
More optimistically, I also discuss nascent attempts to combat racial
discrimination through Brazil's civil litigation system, and evaluate
whether this is a more promising approach to securing justice for
Afro-Brazilians workers.
76. H6dio Silva, Do Racismo Legal ao Principio da Afdo Afirmativa, in
TIRANDO A MASCARA, supra note 23, at 379.
77. Martins, supra note 55, at 429.
78. Racusen, supra note 8, at 247.
79. Id. at 282.
80. Id.
81. CARLOS ALBERTO MEDEIROS, NA LEI E NA RAQA: LEGISLAQ5 AO E
RELAQOES RACIAIS, BRASIL- ESTADOS UNIDOS 115 (2004) (translation by author).
82. Antonio Sdrgio Alfredo Guirnaraes, Measures to Combat Discrimination and
Racial Inequality in Brazil, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL, supra note 38, at
139.
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HI. From Racial Democracy to 'Class-over-race:' Ideology and
Anti-discrimination Law
As Afro-Brazilian activist and law professor Antonio Carlos
Arruda has noted, Brazil was "the last country in the world to do
away with slavery and the first to declare itself a 'racial democracy.'83
Works by North American scholars often have pointed to Brazil's
distinctive ideologies of race relations as factors that have impeded
resistance to racism and inhibited the development of effective anti-
discrimination laws.84 In this section, I discuss two ideologies for
understanding race relations which were dominant in Brazil during
the twentieth century - one which largely denied the existence of
racial prejudice in the country, and another which, while admitting
the presence of racial discrimination, characterizes it mostly as a
symptom of class-based inequality. While U.S. scholars typically have
focused on the influence of the former, I suggest that in recent years
the latter tendency has been equally influential, since it favors
colorblind policies aimed at redressing economic inequality and
undermines support for state action targeting racial discrimination.
A. Racial Democracy
The first of these two ideologies to emerge historically is
commonly known as the "racial democracy" thesis, and was most
prominently articulated by Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre
in the 1930s. Put simply, racial democracy posits that Brazilian
society is relatively free of racial discrimination because extensive
interracial parentage has created a large, mixed race population
incapable of prejudice against each other.85 According to this thesis,
the phenomenon of interracial parentage was originally the product
of both the gender imbalance and the lack of miscegenation taboos
among the country's original Portuguese colonizers, but has been
maintained by the desire of Afro-Brazilians themselves to gain
upward social mobility through a processing of "whitening."'  This
83. Antonio Carlos Arruda da Silva, Questies Legais e Racismo no Hist6ria do
Brasil, in ESTRATf-GIAS E POLTICAS DE COMBATE A DISCRIMINAiO RACIAL
(Kabengele Munanga, ed. 1996) (translation by author).
84. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in
the Enforcement of Anti-discrimination Laws, a United States-Latin America
Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1098-1102 (2002); Racusen, supra note 8, at
339-343; Telles, supra note 10, at 219-243.
85. Telles, supra note 10, at 39.
86. Id.
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mixture allegedly has produced "a new meta-race" who "live in
greater harmony than other people" and "cannot discriminate against
each other. ' 7
By presenting the country's mixed race population as a strength
that enabled Brazil to avoid interracial conflict, "racial democracy"
originally served as a rejoinder to white supremacist claims that
miscegenation would retard national development. 88 It quickly was
adopted by the regime of Gettilio Vargas, whose regime deployed its
egalitarian rhetoric for a different purpose - to co-opt a fledgling
Afro-Brazilian movement for civil rights that arose in the 1940s. 9
In the 1950s, the racial democracy thesis was embraced
internationally as Brazilian society became emblematic of successful
racial integration, and a counter-example to South African apartheid
and U.S. Jim Crow laws.' E. Franklin Frazier observed that in Brazil,
"[c]olor distinctions and prejudices against blacks are seemingly
absent .... One drop of negro blood does not make a person a Negro
and condemn him to become a member of a lower caste." "The
Brazilian Negro ... is first of all a Brazilian," he added, "[he] has faith
in the justice of the courts, and is convinced that his abilities and
achievements will be recognized."9' As Brazil fell under military rule
in the 1960s and 1970s, its generals deployed the image of racial
democracy abroad as a source of legitimacy." At home, however, the
regime repressed any discussion of racial inequality, driving scholars
who challenged the racial democracy thesis - including sociologist
and future president Fernando Henrique Cardoso - into exile
abroad. 93
While widespread recognition of the prevalence of
discrimination against Afro-Brazilians indicates that the Brazilian
public no longer accepts racial democracy as an accurate depiction of
reality, the ideology still possesses significant influence in Brazilian
political culture. Carlos Hasenbalg suggests that racial democracy has
retained legitimacy because it reflects certain distinctive features of
87. Racusen, supra note 8, at 19.
88. Telles, supra note 10, at 39.
89. Id.
90. Thomas Skidmore, Bi-Racial U.S. vs. Multi-Racial Brazil: Is the Contrast Still
Valid, 25 JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 373, 374 (1993).
91. Reichmann, supra note 38, at 3.
92. Telles, supra note 10, at 41.
93. Thomas E. Skidmore, Race and Class in Brazil: Historical Perspectives, in
RACE, CLASS AND POWER IN BRAZIL, supra note 30, at 16.
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Brazilian race relations, among them the absence of legal segregation
and racial conflict during the post-abolition period, the presence of
some non-whites among elites, and the prevalence of interracial
marriage and social mingling.9  Racial democracy may draw
continued support from whites and non-whites for different reasons.
While it benefits whites by masking discrimination and defusing
conflict, for blacks, racial democracy "provides the moral high
ground" in dealings with whites by "remind[ing] their oppressor how
s/he should behave as a good Brazilian."'95
1. Racial Democracy and Anti-Racism
A number of scholars have analyzed the ways in which racial
democracy has impeded Afro-Brazilian resistance to racial
discrimination.' Most fundamentally, by casting any attempt to draw
attention to race as "un-Brazilian," racial democracy tends to
suppress the very discussion of problems related to race relations. 97 It
presents racial discrimination as a subject foreign to Brazilian society
rather than as a problem requiring internal reform. While racial
democracy asserts itself as an expression of a unique Brazilian
character, Tanya Hernandez notes that the claims that "racism is
solely a phenomenon of aberrant racist individuals" and "discussing
race is ... itself racist because it disrupts the harmony of race
neutrality," are prevalent in most Latin American societies with
significant mixed race populations.98 In Latin America, Hernandez
suggests, "rejection of race as a social or formal concept sustains
rather than diminishes white privilege." 99
By promoting a strategy of upward social mobility through
whitening, racial democracy also impedes the development of broad
based solidarity among Afro-Brazilians.1°° Indeed, the lower their
income levels the more likely it is that "brown" Brazilians will self-
identify as "white" and that "black" Brazilians will describe
themselves as "brown."1 1 As a result, Afro-Brazilian activists have
94. Carneiro, supra note 33, at 180.
95. Peter Fry, Color and the Rule of Law in Brazil, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW
AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 186, 199 (Juan E. Mrndez et al. eds.
1999).
96. E.g., Skidmore, supra note 90, at 381-4.
97. Telles, supra note 10, at 232.
98. Hernandez, supra note 84, at 1098.
99. Id. at 1100.
100. Telles, supra note 10, at 8, 232.
101. Id. at 96-99.
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had to devote an inordinate portion of their energies to "convincing
the black to accept his blackness. ' ' "°
While racial segregation in the United States produced wholly
African-American religious, educational and economic institutions
that provided a base of support for the civil rights movement,
comparable Afro-Brazilian institutions are much less common, much
smaller, and more likely to have a more cultural and less politicized
focus.1 3 The effect of racial democracy has been to require the Black
Movement to focus on what might otherwise be considered quite
limited goals. As Anthony Marx observed, "[t]he greatest task and
achievement of the Movimento Negro has been to establish the fact of
racism. Consumed by this task, the movement has been largely
unable to move beyond it to actually organizing much in the way of
mass action.''
2. Racial Democracy and Anti-discrimination Law
As both Brazilian and North American scholars have pointed
out, the influence of the racial democracy thesis also helps explain the
inadequacies of Brazil's anti-discrimination laws.0 5 Denying the
significance of racial discrimination as a problem in Brazilian society
has reinforced the notion that this is an area "where the law did not
have a role to assume."' 6 More subtly, racial democracy has led the
Brazilian legal system to define racial discrimination in terms of the
former segregationist practices of other countries rather than the
forms of discrimination that actually exist in Brazil.1 7 This has
produced laws of a largely symbolic nature, which only address a
narrow range of racial discrimination's effects on the lives of Afro-
Brazilians.
In the courts, racial democracy has disadvantaged the victims of
discrimination and shielded its perpetrators from liability. By casting
victims' allegations as contrary to the national character, or "racist"
themselves, it de-legitimizes claims of racial discrimination.
Moreover, it assists defendants in such cases by obscuring the
prejudicial nature of their practices and providing an automatic
102. Burdick, supra note 65, at 150.
103. Skidmore, supra note 90, at 383-4.
104. Anthony Marx, MAKING RACE AND NATION 262 (1998).
105. E.g., Hernandez, supra note 69, at 6.
106. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 99.
107. Racusen, supra note 8, at 33.
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defense based on their "Brazilianess" or mixed race statusi
The racial democracy thesis has hindered the development of
Brazilian anti-discrimination law by promoting an image of a country
where racial discrimination hardly exists and therefore statutory
protections for the rights of Afro-Brazilians are unnecessary. In its
initial report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination in 1970, Brazil's Foreign Ministry asserted that,
"[s]ince racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil, the Brazilian
Government has no necessity to take.., legislative, judicial or
administrative measures to assure equality of the races. ' °9 While
suppression of racial issues reached its peak during military rule,
successive Brazilian governments maintained basically the same
official position until the mid-1990s. Brazilian historian Carlos
Albertos Medeiros observed that, "a fundamental aspect of
comparison between North American and Brazilian legislation, from
the point of view of racial relations, is that in Brazil the question of
race has been treated as a non-question [since] ... racial problems are
minimal.""'  Similarly, U.S. scholars have noted that the Brazilian
legal system "sees issues of racism as unimportant," and have pointed
to the "myth of the absence of racism" to explain why the country's
anti-discrimination laws remain "woefully inadequate."'
1
This general attitude on the part of the Brazilian state has been
mirrored by a striking lack of attention to this subject in legal
scholarship. Public prosecutor Dora Ltcia de Lima Bertulio charges
that "discrimination in employment is not a question presented for
discussion in the system of law and labor protection in Brazil...
Judges, lawyers and scholars have not discussed this question either in
theory or in practice.",12 While the country's leading sociologists, and
more recently, its major economic think tanks, have produced
considerable research on the impact of racial discrimination, Brazilian
legal scholarship has lacked a comparable body of work. With the
exception of a number of recent texts on affirmative action, few
108. Seth Racusen, Making the 'Impossible Determination': Flexible Opportunity
and Targeted Identity in Contemporary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REV. 787, 805 (2004).
109. Racusen, supra note 8, at 50, (citing Brazil, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by State Parties to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/R-3/Add.11 (1970)).
110. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 99.
111. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 6; Telles, supra note 10, at 240.
112. Dora Ltcia de Lima Bertulio, Consideraq6es Sobre o Racismo e o Direito -
Genero e Raqa nas Relaq3es de Trabalho, in DISCRIMINACAO E SISTEMA LEGAL
BRASILEIRO, supra note 54, at 95.
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books have been published on anti-discrimination law, and many of
these have been doctoral dissertations rather than works by more
established scholars. In a civil law system where the work of legal
scholars - as opposed to prior judicial decisions - heavily influences
the application of the laws, this absence is particularly significant.
a. Racial Democracy and Statutory Law
Unlike in the U.S. where civil rights laws were enacted in
recognition of the need to counteract domestic systems of racial
subordination, in Brazil the influence of the racial democracy thesis
meant that the purpose articulated for the anti-discrimination laws
was to protect Brazilian society from the importation of racism from
abroad. The 1951 Lei Afonso Arinos - "the first piece of legislation
to confront the problem of discrimination in Brazil [and] ... for
nearly forty years the only one" 113 - was adopted in response to an
incident where prominent African-American dancer Katherine
Dunham was denied admittance to a S~o Paulo hotel."' However,
instead of addressing existing discrimination in Brazilian society, the
law was promoted as necessary to prevent the introduction of
American-style segregation. Speaking in support of the legislation,
anthropologist-turned-senator Gilberto Freyre observed that "[i]t is
not surprising that this [incident] occurred in Sdo Paulo, because...
all the 'isms' which are inseparable from.., industrial America
operate in Sdo Paulo with a vengeance."".. The law's sponsor,
Senator Afonso Arinos explained that "the agents of [racial] injustice





The Lei Afonso Arinos established "acts resulting from race or
color prejudice" as a criminal misdemeanor, including denial of
employment, service, lodging or admittance."7 Thus, until the late
1980s Brazil's main anti-discrimination law was one "which
prohibit[ed] social practices of the North American segrega[tionist]
past," but failed to address the covert forms of discrimination far
113. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 108.
114. Racusen, supra note 8, at 122.
115. Id.
116. Seth Racusen, The Ideology of the Brazilian Nation and the Brazilian Legal
Theory of Racial Discrimination, draft paper prepared for delivery at the 2003
Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association 14 (2003) (cited with
permission).
117. Lei 1.390/51 (translation by author).
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more common in Brazilian society. 11  Within the rubric of racial
democracy, however, these less explicit forms of exclusion were not
covered because they did not fit a conception of discrimination based
on the U.S. model of Jim Crow laws. 9 This "narrow construction of
racial discrimination," has severely limited its usefulness to the
persons it purports to protect.2 °
The logic behind making discrimination merely a misdemeanor
offense was that the law's purpose was not to uproot an already
entrenched social problem, but to prevent the emergence of one that
did not currently exist. As one Brazilian author notes, "the legislator
of the penal code considered the practice of racism.., like the illegal
carrying of arms, or vandalism, etc. These acts are punished because
they can cause future prejudice or danger to the security of society.''
This focus on deterring the introduction of racist practices, typically
of foreign origin, into society, is a persistent preoccupation in
Brazilian anti-discrimination law. In a text on employment
discrimination law, Francisco G6rson Marques de Lima cites, as his
chief example of racial discrimination in Brazil, incidents of prejudice
towards mixed race Brazilians by "groups of 'Aryans' among the
country's large German immigrant population. "This is the result,"
charges de Lima, "of discrimination against Brazilians in our own
land by foreigners!'
122
The ideology of racial democracy has shaped not only the policy
of Brazilian anti-discrimination law, but also perceptions of its
effectiveness. In a 1985 case involving a Sdo Paulo nightclub that
refused to admit Afro-Brazilians on the grounds that its clientele
would not accept their presence, the judge concluded, "This was not
racial segregation. In Brazil, this practically does not exist. Blacks are
loved as idols in sports, music, film ... This is so much so that
prosecutions under the Lei Afonso Arinos are very rare, even when
the judges are people of color."' 23
Similarly, in 1986, Jos6 N6ri de Silveira, then-President of the
Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, asserted "that the Arinos Act had
118. Racusen, supra note 116, at 3.
119. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 13.
120. Racusen, supra note 8, at 342.
121. Eunice Aparecida de Jesus Prudente, PRECONCEITO RACIAL E IGUALDADE
JURiDICA NO BRASIL 243 (1989) (translation by author) (emphasis added).
122. Francisco Gdrson Marques de Lima, IGUALDADE DE TRATAMENTO NAS
RELACOES DE TRABALHO (1997) (translation by author).
123. Prudente, supra note 121, at 242.
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been an effective deterrent as evidenced by its lack of use. '24
However doubtful this may seem, when viewed through the lens of
racial democracy, such a claim has its own internal logic. If racial
discrimination is defined as manifested only in explicit acts of
apartheid, then, since such practices did not emerge in Brazil after the
law's passage, the law has been a success.
Even after the emergence of the Black Movement in the late
1970s, the racial democracy thesis continued to influence the
strategies by which Afro-Brazilians sought to strengthen the anti-
discrimination laws. Such efforts focused primarily on enacting
measures that symbolized the state's opposition to racism rather than
creating laws that provide individual plaintiffs with workable means
to combat discrimination. Afro-Brazilian activists sought to "counter
trivialization of racial discrimination" by "argu[ing] that racial
prejudice constitutes a crime against the nation and should therefore
become a felony.
125
The result was Article 5 42 of the 1988 Constitution, which
establishes that the "practice of racism constitutes an unbailable
crime, subject to the punishment of imprisonment."' 26 This provision
was made judicially enforceable by the 1989 Lei Ca6, which replaced
the Lei Afonso Arinos. The Lei Ca6 specifies that "crimes resulting
from prejudice or discrimination of race, color, ethnicity, religion or
national origin," including "to deny or obstruct employment in a
private enterprise," are offenses punishable by two to five years
imprisonment."r
As an expression of a stated commitment to racial equality the
law "represents... a grand conquest of the black movement,"
however, in practical effect the Lei Ca6 "does not offer much
protection to black workers."1  The only successful prosecutions
have been in cases where the defendants were charged with the
"dissemination of a message with racist content" - conduct which
meets racial democracy's narrow conception of discrimination as an
explicit display of racial prejudice.129 Thus, the influence of the racial
124. Racusen, supra note 8, at 128.
125. Id. at 116.
126. C.F. art. 5 91 42 (translation by author).
127. Lei 7.716/89, supra note 7, at arts. 1, 4.
128. Seth Racusen, Reclamando Cidadania no Mercado de Trabalho em Sao
Paulo, in ESTRATtGIAS E POLiTICAS DE COMBATE A DISCRIMINACAo RACIAL 201
(Kabengele Munanga, ed. 1996) (translation by author).
129. Martins, supra note 55, at 429. (translation by author); While complaints
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democracy thesis has required Afro-Brazilian activists to focus their
legislative efforts on securing a symbolic expression of opposition to
racism, rather than the creation of effective legal tools to counter its
effects.
b. Racial Democracy and Anti-discrimination Litigation
1. Effects on Plaintiffs and Their Claims
The influence of the racial democracy thesis has also discouraged
Afro-Brazilians from bringing discrimination complaints in the courts.
Because it defines Brazil as a society lacking racial distinctions and
characterized by relaxed interracial relations, to raise an allegation of
racial discrimination has been to open oneself to charges of being
"un-Brazilian" and even "racist" oneself.3° In a country where
"whitening" is seen as a means of social advancement, asserting that
one is being discriminated against for one's blackness has meant
eschewing this strategy and choosing a lower rung on the social
ladder."' Because racial democracy defines racial discrimination
narrowly as a marginal phenomenon manifested in explicit acts of
prejudice, it has restricted the types of claims that Afro-Brazilians
raise in court.'32
Because racial democracy assumes that Brazilian social relations
are colorblind, those who seek to resist racial discrimination have had
to confront the notion that "to recognize the idea of race and to
promote any anti-racist action based on this idea, even if the actor is
black, is... racism.' ' 33 As an appellate court judge wrote in a 1993
opinion, "[i]n a country like ours.., to attempt to inject racial conflict
involving racial insults often constitute the strongest claims under Brazilian anti-
discrimination law, as Robert Cottrol has noted, in the United States imposition of
criminal penalties in such cases would "run up against severe First Amendment
problems." Robert Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism and
Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TuL. L. REV. 11, 68
(2001). For example, the most well known conviction under the Lei Ca6 is the case
of Siegfried Ellwanger, a neo-Nazi, who was sentenced to a year and nine months
imprisonment for the sale of anti-Semitic publications in 2004. Pena substituida:
Editor nazista 6 condenado a quase dois anos do reclusdo, CONSULTOR JURfDICO
(Sept. 10, 2004), http://conjur.estadao.com.br/, discussing 8a Vara Criminal, Processo-
Crime No. 1397026988-08720 (Aug. 26, 2004).
130. Racusen, supra note 8, at 20; Racusen, supra note 116, at 2.
131. Hernandez, supra note 84, at 1132; Telles, supra note 10, at 96-9.
132. Racusen, supra note 8, at 18.
133. GUIMARAES, RACISMO E ANTI-RACISMO NO BRASIL 206 (2002) (translation
by author).
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is a gesture of pure ignorance, rooted in a lack of understanding of
our history and development."' Similarly, in a 1997 decision denying
relief to a Afro-Brazilian customer subjected to racist abuse by a
shopkeeper, a judge urged that "[tihe racial question and racism
should be ignored in favor peaceful relations among the races." '135
As a result, the victim of discrimination may have to prove she is
not the one being racist by bringing her accusation. Unless the
defendant "after practicing discrimination based on racial prejudice,
states.., that this is the cause of his act," observes Jorge da Silva,
then "at the end of the day, the victim, himself, would be charged as
the racist.
13 6
The ideology of racial democracy has encouraged Afro-
Brazilians to identify as members of a single mixed race nationality,
rather than to resist discrimination as members of a separate racial
subgroup. Unlike in countries with more rigid racial classifications, in
Brazil identifying oneself as a victim of racial discrimination means
voluntarily assuming a lower status in the social hierarchy. Such a
step runs directly counter to the strategy pursued by many Afro-
Brazilians of identifying themselves as brown rather than black, or
white rather than brown, in order to claim a higher social status. On
the 2000 census, where respondents were limited to describing
themselves as black, pardo (brown), white, yellow (i.e. Asian) or
indigenous, only 6.1 percent of the population identified itself as
black, and 38.9 percent as pardo.137  Because "[p]rotesting racial
discrimination.., represents an admission of 'being the type of
person who might be discriminated against,"' bringing such an
allegation in court requires plaintiffs to forgo this path to
advancement.
3 8
Finally, because the racial democracy thesis defines
discriminatory conduct as manifesting itself in explicit displays of
prejudice, it influences the type of complaints that Afro-Brazilians
bring under the anti-discrimination laws. In opinion surveys Afro-
Brazilians "consistently report problems securing work as the
principal discriminatory problem they face.', 139  However, since
employers rarely generally state such prejudices explicitly, such
134. Racusen, supra note 8, at 23.
135. Telles, supra note 10, at 242.
136. da Silva, supra note 70, at 136 (translation by author).
137. Telles, supra note 10, at 79.
138. Racusen, supra note 116, at 2.
139. Racusen, supra note 8, at 18.
2007]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
claims make up less than 5 percent of complaints brought under the
anti-discrimination law."' ° Instead, "Brazilians disproportionately
bring allegations against insults and other.., verbalized prejudice,"
which more clearly fit the commonly accepted definitions of
discrimination.'
Indeed, until the filing of the recent lawsuits against Brazilian
banks based on statistical evidence alone, an open act of racism
appeared to be a prerequisite for claims of workplace discrimination.
Racusen's study of criminal complaints brought under the Lei Ca6
found that incidents involving verbal statements of racial prejudice
made up 96 percent of cases concerning discrimination in the
workplace.'4 2  But until recently, more covert employment
discrimination, particularly in the area of hiring, has gone almost
unchallenged in the courts.
2. Effects on Defendants
When discrimination cases do reach the courts, the influence of
the racial democracy thesis not only handicaps the victims, but also
provides a ready shield for defendants. Most powerfully, it allows the
accused to refute the allegation that their conduct had a racially
prejudicial motive simply by virtue of their own "Brazilianess" and
thus their presumed inability to discriminate.'13  Defendants have
been able to assert their lack of culpability by claiming that because
of their own mixed race background, or their marriage to a non-white
spouse, or their friendships with blacks, or even their spiritual
devotion to a black saint, they could not possibly be prejudiced.'44
According to Racusen, this "Brazilian defense" is with few
exceptions, generally accepted by judges, prosecutors and police
when asserted in cases involving allegations of discrimination.
45
Moreover, since many "white" Brazilians claim some African
ancestry or are married to someone of mixed race, it is widely
available.' 6  For example, in a 2003 prosecution for hiring
discrimination, the judge found that simply by virtue of being a
140. Id. at 202.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 209.
143. Racusen, supra note 116, at 2.
144. Martins, supra note 55, at 423; Racusen, supra note 108, at 805.
145. Racusen, supra note 108, at 805.
146. Telles, supra note 10, at 79.
[Vol. 30:3
No Vale a Pena? (Not Worth the Trouble?)
mulato, the defendant was "inherently unprejudiced.' 147 Likewise, in
a 1995 case where the defendant was quoted as saying that "the place
of the Negro is in the senzala [slave quarters]" the police officer who
investigated the case recommending dropping charges, since the
accused "had a person of color in his family and could not be
prejudiced."' 8 And in a 1994 case brought against an employee who
called a co-worker, "monkey, preto [the color "black" used
pejoratively], son of an incompetent whore," the defendant asserted
that he since he was of mixed race "just like the victim," he was
incapable of discriminating against someone with the "same Negra
origin."' 49
Racial democracy also imposes a double standard for how
references to race are treated by the courts. While those who bring
allegations of discriminatory conduct are seen as having
inappropriately interjected the issue, use of racially demeaning
language is often considered insufficient to establish a prejudicial
motive. Defendants who use racial slurs often "claim that the
pejorative expressions are recurrent in everyday practice as jokes."'5°
Likewise, terms that would appear to indicate prejudice are
explained away as indications of informality and intimacy. In a 1993
case the defendant, a bank manager, ordered a cleaning contractor to
reassign its black employee, threatening to cancel its contract if "that
neguinha [literally "blackie"] even entered the bank again......
Prosecutors, however, accepted the defendant's claim that he used
the term affectionately, and recommended that the complaint be
dropped.'52
B. Class-over-race
A second ideology that has affected the development of the anti-
discrimination law admits that racial discrimination exists in Brazil,
but asserts that it is merely a symptom of class inequality and
therefore of lesser salience as a focal point for social reform. In part,
because it is compatible with recognition that discrimination exists,
147. Racusen, supra note 108, at 806.
148. Id. at 807.
149. Pretola means the color "black" and almost always is used pejoratively
when referring to a person. Negro/a signifies belonging to the "black race," and is
used positively by Afro-Brazilians. Id. at 806.
150. Martins, supra note 55, at 423.
151. Racusen, supra note 8, at 298.
152. Id.
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this thesis has begun to supplant racial democracy as more
descriptively accurate, though racial democracy still retains influence
as a normative ideal. Like racial democracy, this ideology - which I
refer to as the "class-over-race" thesis - is compelling because it
accurately explains some aspects of the country's social relations, and
thus resonates with both political and intellectual elites and ordinary
Brazilians as well.
Like racial democracy, the class-over-race thesis has hindered
the development of Brazilian anti-discrimination law. First, because
this ideology makes it difficult for Afro-Brazilians to distinguish racial
discrimination from class prejudice, it discourages recourse to anti-
discrimination law by potential complainants.53 Second, because the
use of class distinction as a basis for differential treatment has long
been accepted within the Brazilian legal system, the legitimacy of
class prejudice provides a cover for perpetrators of racial
discrimination. Finally, the dominance of class over race as a basis for
political mobilization has weakened the ability of Afro-Brazilians to
press for policies specifically aimed at addressing racial
discrimination. Instead, either as a result of cooption or as a strategic
choice, Afro-Brazilian activists have tended to ally themselves with
class-based political parties that, until recently, have pursued race-
blind redistributionist programs rather than confronting racial
discrimination head-on.
Class-over-race theories of Brazilian racial relations first gained
prominence with postwar research led by sociologist Florestan
Fernandes, and sponsored by UNESCO as part of an effort to draw
lessons from the country's successful multiracial society." These
studies, however, documented a deep socioeconomic divide between
white and non-white Brazilians. The UNESCO researchers
concluded, however, that "race was a subordinate variable in
determining social stratification," and that "underdevelopment" was
the dominant factor that "held back non-white Brazilians."' 5
Nevertheless continued research over the next three decades
demonstrated that this inequality could not be explained solely by
underdevelopment alone, but instead reflected pervasive and
persistent discrimination against Afro-Brazilians. Moreover, research
showing that "brown" Brazilians occupied a socioeconomic status
153. Guimardes, supra note 44, at 169.
154. Skidmore, supra note 90, at 375.
155. Id.
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hardly superior to blacks but far below that of whites revealed that
racial democracy's promise of social mobility through interracial
marriage was largely a myth.56 In addition, economic data showed
that the income gap between whites and non-whites actually
increased during Brazil's "miracle" period of rapid growth during the
1960s and 1970s.
1 57
While this research did much to discredit the racial democracy
thesis, it not lead to a policy consensus in support of measures aimed
at countering discrimination, even after Brazil's return to democracy
in the 1980s. As Thomas Skidmore observed in 1985, the Brazilian
left identified "[s]ocial class [a]s the most fundamental variable ... for
studying society and for changing it," and "dismiss[ed] race as a false
issue., 158 Throughout the 1990s political elites continued to "reduce
the race issue to one of class conflict that would be solved by the
building of socialism or the implementing of universal race-neutral
income distribution policies."'5 9 Thus, even after the problem of
racial discrimination has emerged from behind the faqade of racial
democracy, the influence of the class-over-race thesis has meant that
efforts to confront the issue have faced considerable resistance-even
from the most committed supporters of social change.
1. Class Prejudice and Racial Discrimination
Just as the influence of racial democracy has been sustained by
the fact that Brazilian society is indeed characterized by widespread
interracial mingling, the persuasiveness of the class-over-race thesis
reflects the reality that the country also is pervaded by extreme
inequalities of wealth. Because "Brazil['s] culture was more
comfortable with status and hierarchy," its traditional elites had less
need than their counterparts in the U.S. south to adopt explicit legal
measures to maintain racial subordination during the post-abolition
period. 16 The result has been a strong tradition of recognizing class
instead of race as a legitimate basis for differential treatment in the
courts.
6
156. do Valle Silva, supra note 30, at 54-5.
157. Telles, supra note 10, at 126.
158. Skidmore, supra note 90, at 17.
159. Sdrgio da Silva Martins, Carlos Alberto Medeiros, Elisa Larkin
Nascimento, Paving Paradise: The Road from 'Racial Democracy' to Affirmative
Action, in 34 BRAZIL JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES 787, 788 (2004).
160. Cottrol, supra note 129, at 54.
161. Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA. J. INT'L
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Antonio Guimardes observes that "[c]lasses in Brazil, to the
contrary of... the United States, are considered legitimate bases for
inequality of treatment and opportunity ..."6' Brazilians who
recognize the existence of racial discrimination in the country,
nevertheless, often describe it as less virulent than that of the bias of
rich against poor. Darcy Ribeiro accuses the descendants of Brazil's
slave-owning elite of "still hold[ing] the same attitude of vile
contempt where the black is concerned," but later notes that "more
than a prejudice of color, Brazilians have a deep-seated class
prejudice."' 63
Defendants in racial discrimination cases often use the
acceptability of class prejudice in order to disguise their motives and
thereby avoid liability. Recasting racial discrimination as class
prejudice has been a longstanding strategy for placing such conduct
beyond the ambit of the law. In a 1979 case brought under the Lei
Afonso Arinos, the court accepted the excuse of a doorman who
denied an Afro-Brazilian lawyer access to a building's elevator that
"he had taken the victim for a servant."'" Similarly, in a 1989 case, a
salon owner in an apartment complex justified refusing an
appointment to an Afro-Brazilian housekeeper by claiming that his
establishment "could not serve domestics."' 65  Courts appear to
routinely accept such excuses because, as one judge observed, while
"much more segregation is social and economic than racial... [the
former] does not represent a crime like the latter."' The ability of
defendants to explain away acts of illegal racial discrimination as
permissible expressions of class prejudice is therefore a further factor
in persuading Afro-Brazilians of the futility of legal action.
The fact that "a poor 'black' or 'brown' may not know whether
particular mistreatment is based on race or class" also narrows the
situations where Afro-Brazilians are likely to bring complaints in the
courts. 67 Cases alleging racial discrimination in the workplace nearly
always involve use of racial insults, since the verbal offense
constitutes "the only available evidence, for the complainant, that the
L. 1, 15-16 (1984).
162. Guimardes, supra note 44, at 206.
163. Darcy Ribeiro, THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE: THE FORMATION AND MEANING
OF BRAZIL, 154, 165 (Gregory Rabassa trans. Univ. Press of Fla. 2000).
164. Prudente, supra note 121, at 239.
165. da Silva, supra note 70, at 162.
166. Prudente, supra note 121, at 242.
167. Racusen, supra note 116, at 2.
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discrimination suffered... was, really, of a racial nature and not
merely of class."'"
By contrast, asserting a legal claim based on class - one's status
as a worker - is a far more straightforward proposition. Brazil's
labor code confers on employees a vast array of legal rights, and
creates a dedicated system of labor courts for their enforcement.69
Because of this, Brazilian workers long have been described as having
"a juridical consciousness of class., 17' Racial discrimination,
particularly in its less explicit forms, creates injuries that are more
difficult for victims to define as violations of the law, where the legal
system provides less obvious and accessible avenues for redress.
2. Class Politics and the Black Movement
Like racial democracy, the class-over-race thesis has hindered
Afro-Brazilian efforts to garner the political support necessary to
enact laws aimed at remedying racial inequality and discrimination.
Because efforts at political mobilization on the basis of race have
been relatively unsuccessful compared to those based on class, Afro-
Brazilian movements have faced cooption by class-based party
politics, and submersion of their agendas under broader populist
programs. Even where they have maintained a distinct presence and
agenda within political parties, Afro-Brazilian activists often have
been treated as representing a "special interest" rather than a
constituency numbering nearly half the population. Afro-Brazilians
typically have gained leadership in class-based parties by representing
other, more influential constituencies such as trade unions or
organizations of favela residents. Rarely have they come to
prominence as leaders of the Black Movement itself.
"In Brazil," writes Guimardes, "class mobilization has been the
most successful form of mobilization.' 17' Afro-Brazilian organizations
have had considerable difficulty mobilizing black Brazilians, so much
so that "a good part of the black population feels more attracted by
the trade unions and left political parties, than by black
institutions.' '72 Brazil's labor parties in particular have been able to
attract strong support from Afro-Brazilians, but mostly through their
support for class-based redistribution programs, not opposition to
168. Guimaraes, supra note 44, at 169.
169. See infra pp. 55-56.
170. French, DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 111.
171. Guimardes, supra note 128, at 213.
172. Id.
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racial discrimination.
Anthony Marx observes of Brazilian electoral contests that, "the
general lack of any explicit use of racial politics.., in a setting of
tremendous inequality remains striking.""' In contrast to the United
States, where racial politics often have been employed to head-off
class-based political challenges, the opposite dynamic has held sway
in Brazil. In the 1930s Getfilio Vargas' Brazilian Workers Party
("PTB") secured the support of Black workers by passing laws
requiring employers to give preference to native Brazilians (which
included nearly all Afro-Brazilians) over immigrants (who were
predominantly European and Asian).'74 The contemporary successor
to the PTB, the Workers Democratic Party ("PDT") still tends to
attract strong Afro-Brazilian support and the participation of
prominent black leaders, including pioneering civil rights activist
Abdias do Nascimento."
Afro-Brazilian activists have tended to work within larger class-
based organizations rather than establishing an independent political
agenda. While many involved in the Black Movement in 1970s and
1980s also joined the newly founded Workers Party ("PT"), these
activists formed only one element in an "uneasy mix" of social
movements that "gravitated toward the PT in its capacity as an
alternative political proposal.' '7 6  Because the Black Movement's
presence within the PT lacked the influence of a core constituency
like the trade unions, it was not until 1987 that the party first gave
serious attention to the issue of racial discrimination.'"
Like the PDT, the PT has had amongst its leaders prominent
Afro-Brazilians, including Benedita da Silva, originally a community
activist in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and Vincente Paulo da Silva,
former president of the CUT, one of the country's leading trade
union federations. 78 However, such leaders have typically seen their
roles within the PT as representatives of these organizations rather
than of the Black Movement. As Benedita da Silva explains,
173. Marx, supra note 104, at 259.
174. Leila Gonzales, The Unified Black Movement: A New Stage in Black
Political Mobilization, in RACE, CLASS AND POWER IN BRAZIL, supra note 30, at 130.
175. E.g., Reichmann, supra note 38, at 15, 21.
176 Fredrickson, supra note 36, at 15; Margaret E. Keck, THE WORKERS' PARTY
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL 15 (1992).
177. Ivanir dos Santos, Blacks and Political Power, in RACIAL POLITICS IN
CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL [hereinafter RACIAL POLITICS] 200, 208 (Michael Hanchard
ed., 1999).
178. Marx, supra note 104, at 259.
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Those of us in the PT face many difficulties in dealing with what is
traditionally meant by a black movement in order to meet black
expectations. As a black woman, I am not there to represent the
militant wing of the black movement, but rather underpaid blacks
179who live in the slums ....
Thus, the influence of the class-over-race thesis has meant that anti-
racist politics often are marginalized within the left parties, even if
Afro-Brazilians themselves are not.
3. Class-Over-Race and Social Policy
The Brazilian left often has deployed the Black Movement's
critique of racial inequality to support its redistributionist agendas,
but only rarely to promote initiatives to combat discrimination.
Because Afro-Brazilians make up an overwhelming majority of the
poor, and because the leading factor in racial inequality is lack of
access to public goods such as education, it has made sense for the
Black Movement to support this agenda. Moreover, in the
employment arena, colorblind policies have provided some shelter to
Afro-Brazilians from workplace discrimination. However, a failure to
adopt legislation that would enable Afro-Brazilians to effectively
challenge discrimination in the labor market may mean that Afro-
Brazilians workers will face continued difficulties in extracting full
benefits from such reforms.
As Guimardes observes, "to say that the poor are poor because
they are black, and not because the country is poor, is a creative
strategy for holding responsible the elite of the country, who, until
today, hide their.., interests behind theories like racial democracy or
underdevelopment."'" For the left, the Black Movement's charges of
systemic racial discrimination have represented a powerful counter-
argument to claims that poverty can only be alleviated gradually
through economic growth. As the left has deployed this critique in
support of redistributionist programs to benefit the poor, Afro-
Brazilian activists have, until recently, supported its agenda and
deferred demands for more race-specific policies."' This is in part
because the Afro-Brazilian poor will be the primary beneficiaries of
such programs, and because the alternative, a "minority politics"
179. Benedita da Silva, The Black Movement and Political Parties: A Challenging
Alliance, in RACIAL POLITICS, supra note 177, at 184.
180. Guirnardes, supra note 44, at 63.
181. Guimardes, supra note 17, at 177.
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based on race, "runs the risk of losing legitimacy. ' ' 2
Moreover since redistributionist programs represent a significant
advance for Afro-Brazilians over the patronage-based politics of
traditional elites, it is not surprising that Afro-Brazilians would lend
them support rather than be marginalized politically through a race-
focused approach. For example, even absent affirmative action
programs, Afro-Brazilian workers appear to face less discrimination
within the public sector, where the government has imposed
standardized hiring and compensation practices, than they do in
private sector firms where informal systems of social connections
prevail. A study comparing petrochemical companies in the state of
Bahia found significantly higher employment of black and brown
workers, at higher occupational levels, in state-owned companies than
in private firms.' A broader study in 1989 of labor markets in
Brasilia, the seat of Brazil's federal bureaucracy, and SAo Paulo, its
center of private industry and finance, found the levels of disparity
between black and white unemployment rates and salary levels to be
several times higher in the latter."
Clearly, Afro-Brazilians do benefit from redistributionist policies
that do not specifically target racial inequality. Yet, for many Afro-
Brazilian workers, the promise of a class-over-race agenda to
ameliorate inequality through broad-based improvements in
education and other social welfare programs may prove a frustrating
mirage. Without effective means to challenge discriminatory
practices in private sector employment, Afro-Brazilians may have
difficulty converting enhanced human capital into greater racial
equality.
IV. Prejudice and Punishment: Brazil's 'Thin'
Anti-discrimination Law
In this section, I examine Brazil's anti-discrimination statutes, to
consider the extent to which the laws themselves, as well as their
interpretation by Brazilian courts and law enforcement agencies, are
responsible for the legal system's failure to effectively address racial
discrimination in the labor market. First I consider two factors which
a number of scholars have identified as responsible for the law's
182. Guimar~es, supra note 44, at 63.
183. Castro & Guimaraes, Racial Inequalities in the Labor Market and the
Workplace, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL, supra note 38, at 92-6.
184. Roland, supra note 30, at 5.
[Vol. 30:3
Ndo Vale a Pena? (Not Worth the Trouble?)
ineffectiveness: its counter-productive emphasis on penal sanctions
and its narrow conception of discrimination as conduct manifesting
overt displays of racial prejudice. I also look at another consequence
of the anti-discrimination law's penal focus, the central role this gives
to police and public prosecutors in its enforcement. Next I show how
the basic doctrines of Brazilian anti-discrimination law have
continued to shape efforts at its reform. I conclude that, despite
attempts to improve their efficacy, reliance on these statutes has
proved a dead end street for those seeking to challenge racial
discrimination.
A. A Punitive Approach to Anti-discrimination Law
Both U.S. and Brazilian scholars have recognized the
counterproductive impact of the punitive approach employed by the
country's core anti-discrimination statutes, the Lei Afonso Arinos and
its successor, the Lei Ca6, which impose criminal sanctions for acts of
racial prejudice. Robert Cottrol has observed that in Brazil,
"criminalization may have actually hindered the development of a
body of robust civil rights law." 185 The most direct effect of the penal
approach has been that courts require a high burden of proof, "the
criminal standard of evidence 'beyond a doubt,"' to establish
defendants' liability for discriminatory conduct.
1 86
The enactment of the Lei Ca6, which establishes racism as an
"unbailable crime" punishable by one to five years imprisonment, has
made judges even more reluctant to convict defendants, since it means
imposing a relatively harsh penalty for what may appear to be a minor
offense.'" This has led judges to further raise the bar for establishing
liability, in particular, for satisfying the requirement of proving the
defendant's prejudicial motive." An Afro-Brazilian civil rights
organization's study of prosecutions under the Lei Ca6 identified its
harsh penalties as one of the chief "impediments to its utility.,
189
B. A Narrow Focus on Prejudice
By criminalizing acts "resulting from race or color prejudice,"
Brazilian anti-discrimination law adopted the racial democracy thesis'
185. Cottrol, supra note 129 at 75.
186. Racusen, supra note 8, at 87.
187. Lei 7.716/89, supra note 7; Medeiros, supra note 81, at 121.
188. Racusen, supra note 8, at 31.
189. Fry, supra note 95, at 201.
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narrow conception of discrimination as manifested in overt displays
of prejudice.' 9 The result, in the words of Supreme Court President
Marco Aurelio Mello is a "jurisprudence under which the victim
need[s] proof of the specific motive of the opposing party.'
91
Brazilian courts have interpreted the standard for conviction under
the Lei Ca6 to require proof by direct evidence of (1) the
discriminatory act; (2) the defendant's prejudice towards the victim;
and (3) a causal relationship between the two.192 As Jorge da Silva
points out, for a finding of guilt "it is necessary that someone, after
practicing discrimination because of racial prejudice, state.., that
this was the cause of the act."' 93
Because racial discrimination is often covert, many harms to
Afro-Brazilian workers fall beyond the reach of the laws. For
example, in a 1995 case where a complaint was brought against an
employer who admitted requiring "boa apar~ncia" - in other words,
whiteness - in a job posting, the Public Ministry refused to bring
charges.' 94 The prosecutor explained that "although one repudiates
this odious behavior," it was not possible to bring charges because
"the practice unfortunately is veiled."' 195
C. Unavailability of Burden Shifting
The requirement of direct evidence of prejudicial motive means
that the Lei Ca6 does not permit the burden shifting methods used to
establish liability under U.S. anti-discrimination law. Because, until
now, the Brazilian judiciary "has not... allow[ed] racial disparities in
employment to serve as evidence of discrimination, '196 it has had no
equivalent in its jurisprudence to the theory of discrimination based
on the disparate impact of facially neutral practices adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power." Similarly, until
recently, the Brazilian legal system had not produced a theory of
liability based on statistical evidence showing discriminatory pattern
and practice of the type the U.S. Court upheld in International
190. Lei 7.716/89, supra note 7.
191. Mello, supra note 54, at 22.
192. Racusen, supra note 8, at 93.
193. da Silva, supra note 70, at 136.
194. Racusen, supra note 8, at 25-7.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 88-9.
197. Cottrol, supra note 129, at 70; Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Brotherhood of Teamsters.98 The bank employee litigation, which is
the first Brazilian case to assert liability based solely on statistical
evidence, was brought as a constitutional claim and not under the Lei
Ca6.1 9
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure does allow burden
shifting in civil lawsuits when "production of evidence by the ...
[plaintiff] is impossible or extremely difficult." 200 Brazilian courts also
apply burden shifting in cases where workers bring constitutional
claims alleging age or sex discrimination as a result of such
employment criteria as mandatory retirement limits or minimum
height requirements. 1 In such situations, Brazilian courts require
defendants to demonstrate the "reasonableness" of the disputed
practices based on: (1) their relationship to the employer's purported
purpose; (2) their consistency with the Brazilian Constitution; (3) the
existence of an alternative practice less burdensome on the plaintiff;
and (4) the proportionality between the burden on the plaintiff and
the benefits of the policy for the employer °. 2  By contrast, in cases
involving claims of racial discrimination judges have not applied this
method and "placed no evidentiary burden on employers to
demonstrate their rationale."'2 3
D. Misconstruing Claims
Another way in which the law's penal approach influences the
treatment of discrimination claims is by placing police and public
prosecutors in the role of gatekeepers to the courts. As a result these
institutions strongly affect the way in which complaints of racial
discrimination are legally construed and enter the courts. Here again,
the law's emphasis on criminal penalties and its requirement of
prejudicial motive combine to the detriment of those it is supposed to
protect.
Attempts to bring racial discrimination claims typically begin
with the filing of a complaint with the police.' This is due not only to
198. Racusen, supra note 8, at 88-9; Cottrol, supra note 129, at 70; International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
199. Press Release, Ministdrio Pdiblico do Trabalho, supra note 2.
200. Fernando Eduardo Serec, Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 97,
107 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003).
201. Racusen, supra note 8, at 98-9.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 297.
204. Id. at 20.
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the classification of racial discrimination as a criminal offense under
the Lei Ca6, but also most victims' lack of resources. Civil litigation
can be a risky proposition for plaintiffs since Brazilian law generally
operates according to a "loser pays" system and attorneys generally
require some form of up front fee.2 5 Moreover, a criminal conviction
constitutes a civil judgment for which the victim may seek damages
and victims may participate in the prosecution by proposing means of
proof and participating in collection of evidence.2' Therefore, there
are significant advantages to bringing complaints to the public
authorities rather than immediately pursuing a private lawsuit.
Despite the potential advantages for victims, channeling such
complaints through the police appears to actually reduce the number
of discrimination claims that make it to the courts. Although over 95
percent of incidents of discrimination reported to police involve
verbal statements of prejudice, the Lei Ca6 did not specify that use of
racial epithets represented a violation of the law.2' As a result, most
complainants, and in particular those who bring allegations of
discrimination in the workplace, were told by police that the conduct
they reported did not violate the anti-discrimination law.2"
Of the 213 complaints of racial bias filed from 1993 to 1995 with
the Sdo Paulo state police's Department of Social Communications,
which was tasked with investigating violations of the Lei Ca6, Seth
Racusen found that over 75 percent were classified as injtria - a
private offense, similar to defamation, which must be litigated by the
victim herself - and not as grounds for prosecution under the Lei
Ca6.2°9 In cases where the victim alleged discrimination related to
employment, the largest single category of complaints, police deemed
less than a handful to constitute violations of the anti-discrimination
law.21°
205. Serec, supra note 200, at 111; Sergio Bermudes, Administration of Civil
Justice in Brazil, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 347, 352 (Adrian A. S. Zuckerman et al. eds., 1999).
206. Weber Martins Batista, An Overview of Brazilian Criminal Procedure, in A
PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 207, 213 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds.,
1992); Michael Mary Nolan, Vera Regina Fonterreira Fontes & Linnis Cook, Legal
Assistance in Sdo Paulo, Brazil, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 414 (1994).
207. Racusen, supra note 8, at 155, 209; Guimardes, Measures to Combat
Discrimination and Racial Inequality in Brazil, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL,
supra note 38, at 140.
208. Racusen, supra note 8, at 205, 227; Guimardes, supra note 38, at 140.
209. Racusen, supra note 8, at 23-25, 227.
210. Id. at 205.
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Racusen suggests that police classified complaints as injftria
because they view verbal statements of racial prejudice in isolation
from other non-facially discriminatory acts, even when the latter
caused more concrete harm to the victim.1 Since a verbal statement
alone may not have appeared serious enough to merit the arrest
without bail that the Lei Ca6 commands, police apparently were
reluctant to treat them as violations of the statute. Once the police
classified complaints of racial discrimination as injuria, victims were
much less prone to pursue their claims. Complaints classified as
injfiria were nine times less likely to result in judicial proceedings
than those police treated as violations of the Lei Ca6.2 2
Thus the de facto result of police involvement has been to further
heighten the law's already rigorous standard of proof. In
investigating complaints involving employment discrimination, police
found violations of the Lei Ca6 only when defendants made verbal
statements of prejudice at the same time they took adverse action
towards the victim which was explicitly covered by the statute - i.e.,
"obstructing or denying employment. ' '2" However, in situations
where the employer's prejudicial statement occurred before or after
- . 214
the adverse action, police classified the complaint as injuria. Thus
unless victims had evidence of (1) conduct explicitly covered under
the statute; (2) defendant's overt expression of a prejudicial motive;
and (3) these elements being present at the same time, even police
tasked with investigating racial crimes were likely to reject the
complaint.
E. Punishment, Prejudice and Legislative Reform
Despite the scarcity of successful prosecutions under the Lei
Afonso Arinos and Lei Ca6, those who sought reform of Brazilian
anti-discrimination law remained wedded to the same punitive
approach. Throughout the mid-1990s leading Black Movement
NGOs, while criticizing the deficiencies of the existing laws, focused
their legislative efforts on expanding the anti-discriminations
provisions of the criminal code."5 One result was the 1997 Lei
211. Id. at 255.
212. Racusen, supra note 8, at 232.
213. Id. at 205,255.
214. Id. at 255.
215. Sueli Carneiro, A Experigncia do Geledes: SOS Racismo na Tutela dos
Direitos de Cidadania da Populaqio Negra, in ESTRATtGIAS E POLTICAS DE
COMBATE A DISCRIMINACAO RACIAL 135 (Kabengele Munanga ed., 1996).
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Pam, 26 sponsored by Afro-Brazilian Senator Paulo Pafm of the PT,
which amends the penal code to permit "injairia [to] be punished with
the same rigor as racial crimes [under the Lei Ca6]."217
Carlos Medeiros claims that, "independent of the ultimate
sentence," this amendment "has shown itself more agile and
efficacious than the Leis Afonso Arinos and Ca6" since "the accused
have gained highly negative visibility in addition to sometimes
spending time in jail."2 '8 But while this amendment closes the "injaria
loophole,"'2 9 it further cements the notion that the law only addresses
explicitly discriminatory practices. And though constitutional
impediments to the imposition of criminal sanctions for racist speech
are weaker in Brazil than in the United States,220 it seems likely that
courts will remain hesitant to impose prison sentences solely for
verbal insults.
Paim continued to pursue the same approach in a bill he
introduced in the senate in 2000 entitled the "Statute of Racial
Equality."22' The proposed legislation contains ambitious measures
for affirmative action, land rights for Quilombo communities of
descendants of escaped slaves, and consideration of reparations for
slavery.222 However, in its anti-discrimination provisions, Paim's bill
does not alter the Lei Ca6's approach, but merely proposes
expanding its reach to punish employers who "hinder the promotion
or receipt of any other job-related benefit," "fail to provide necessary
equipment," or "provide... differential treatment in work
environment, especially in salary" on the basis of race or skin color.2 3
Indeed, aside from prohibiting firms that are hiring new employees
from using the term "boa aparencia" in job listings or requesting
photographs on job applications (which would indicate race), the
proposed amendments fail completely to address the problem of
covert discrimination. 22'  Racusen concludes that because Paim's
proposal "defer[s] to the 1989 law [the Lei Ca6]" and "does not
216. Lei 9.459 de 13 de Maio de 1997
217. Guimardes, supra note 44, at 169.
218. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 122.
219. Racusen, supra note 8, at 155.
220. See Cottrol, supra note 129.
221. Paulo Pafm, Estatuto da Igualdade Racial, Projeto de Lei 3.198/00, in ACOES
AFIRMATIVAS: POLITICAS PUBLICAS CONTRA AS DESIGUALDADES RACIAIS 161
(Renato Emerson dos Santos & FAtima Lobato eds., 2003).
222. Id.
223. 1d. at 175.
224. Id. at 176.
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modify... [its] theory of racial discrimination" it is unlikely "to
provide a stronger basis for future litigation.,
225
Even statutory reforms aimed specifically at the issue of
employment discrimination, while more innovative in certain
respects, suffer from some of the same limitations as of the Lei Ca6.
Law 9.029 of 1995 amended the Civil Code to offer victims of
discriminatory termination a choice between reinstatement with back
pay or damages equal to twice their lost wages.226 While the law also
contains a general "prohibition on the adoption of any discriminatory
practice and limitation which affects access to employment, or its
maintenance," this ban is limited to discrimination "for motive of sex,
origin, race, color, marital status, family situation or age. '27 Thus, it
appears that plaintiffs still must prove the defendant's prejudicial
intent in order to establish liability.
Marques de Lima, pointing to Law 9.029's failure to prohibit a
broader range of discriminatory practices, criticizes its sponsors for
having "let slip through [their] ... fingers an opportunity bring into
more notable effect equality of treatment in employment relations.,
228
He also observes that the provision of reinstatement for
discriminatory termination is undermined by the lack of protection
for plaintiffs from subsequent employer retaliation, a flaw that
"makes the exercise of the right unviable.,, 229 Because Brazilian law
provides relatively strong protections from employer retaliation for
individuals exercising other workplace rights, such as union stewards,
health and safety representatives and workers taking parental leave,230
the lack of similar provision for workers bringing discrimination
claims is particularly notable.
While Marques de Lima claims that the 1995 law expands the
coverage of Brazilian anti-discrimination law to encompass the same
type of indirect harms that the U.S. Court dealt with in Griggs v.
Duke Power, it is unclear whether this is really an accurate
comparison. As an example of the practices prohibited by the statute,
Lima states that the law forbids employers from imposing "higher
requirements for blacks.., to be hired," or to deny employment
225. Racusen, supra note 116, at 18.
226. Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de abril de 1995, art. 4 [hereinafter Lei 9.029/95].
227. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
228. Marques de Lima, supra note 122, at 19.
229. Id. at 197.
230. Roberto Fragale, Employment Litigation on the Rise? A Brazilian
Perspective, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 281, 294 (2001).
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"through greater rigor in tests [or] interviews." '231 Such policies
constitute discrimination through differential treatment, and thus are
distinguishable from those at issue in Griggs, where the defendant
had adopted an employment test that, while applied neutrally, had a
disparate impact on black employees.
Marques de Lima raises further doubts that the 1995 statute
permits disparate impact analysis when he emphasizes that, "intent is
indispensable to the configuration of the crime, which in cases of
work relations, must be specific, that is to say, whose desire is to
impede or obstruct access of someone qualified to a position or
job."'232 The power of disparate impact analysis, of course, is that its
burden-shifting process allows plaintiffs to establish liability without
proving any intent on the part of the employer to discriminate. Thus,
even as legislators have sought to provide broader legal protections
for Afro-Brazilian workers, the notion that racial discrimination
manifests itself solely in intentional acts of prejudice continues to
constrain the reach of the law.
V. Civil Litigation: A Path Worth Taking?
Perhaps the most compelling critique of the Brazilian legal
system's punitive approach to racial discrimination is that of civil
rights attorney Hddio Silva, who charges that this model not only has
been a dead end for Afro-Brazilian workers, but also has impeded
exploration of more promising routes of legal action. In an article
written in 2000, Silva outlined the model's "tragic effects:"
(a) the quick and convenient invocation of the criminal law,
repressive methods and criminal sanctions; (b) consequently a
depressing, structural incapacity to explore other responses to the
violation of the right to equality that are available in the [legal]
order, for example, objective civil responsibility as envisioned in
Article 1 of [ILO] Convention 111233 and Article 6 of the
[International] Convention Against All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; and (c) non-perception of a formidable
231. Marques de Lima, supra note 122, at 60.
232. Id. at 95.
233. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 362 U.N.TS.
31, entered into force June 15, 1960 [hereinafter ILO No. 111].
234. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.
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combination of methods of confronting the problem... 23
In the last decade, Brazilian public prosecutors and civil rights
attorneys, recognizing the limitations of the criminal anti-
discrimination statutes and sensing opportunities under the country's
new Constitution, have begun to explore whether civil litigation
presents more viable options for challenging racial discrimination in
the workplace.
Legal practitioners and scholars have identified three elements of
the Brazil's civil litigation system that offer advantages for
employment discrimination claims brought by Afro-Brazilian
workers. First, a few individuals have already achieved notable
success by bringing suits under the Brazilian Constitution's equality
and anti-discrimination provisions. Such constitutional claims are
being further tested in the current bank employee litigation.
Moreover, these constitutional claims demonstrate that Brazil's
incorporation of international conventions on employment
discrimination into its new constitutional order provides grounds for
courts to take a broader view of employers' liability for non-facially
discriminatory practices.
Second, discrimination claims can be brought within the
country's well-developed labor law system, which may be a more
favorable mechanism for Afro-Brazilian workers than criminal
prosecution of employers under the Lei Ca6. Finally, Brazilian class
action law confers standing on public prosecutors and non-
governmental organizations to bring lawsuits on behalf of large
groups of workers, though use of this provision is a novel concept.
This section will briefly evaluate the potential advantages and
limitations of civil litigation strategies as alternative methods for
combating discrimination against Afro-Brazilians in the labor market.
Attorneys associated with the Black Movement have pointed to
several important advantages that civil litigation of discrimination
claims may offer Afro-Brazilian plaintiffs and civil rights
organizations.f 7 First, and most obviously, the burden of proof and
evidentiary requirements for establishing liability are greatly reduced.
A related advantage is that under the civil litigation regimes
mentioned above - constitutional equality claims, labor law, and
class action procedure - Brazilian courts already employ this type of
235. Silva, supra note 76, at 382.
236. Martins, et. al., supra note 159, at 800.
237. Telles, supra note 10, at 245.
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burden-shifting analysis needed to challenge covert acts of
discrimination. In addition, civil litigation may offer economic
incentives for plaintiffs and counsel to pursue discrimination claims
more aggressively than police and prosecutors have done in the past.
Moreover, fee awards generated by successful civil litigation may
provide resources to support expanded legal services and advocacy by
Black Movement organizations. Although there is, as yet, limited
jurisprudence or scholarship on the application of Brazil's
constitutional, labor and class action laws to claims of racial
discrimination, that which does exist suggests that civil litigation will
be a more effective tool for advancing the rights of Afro-Brazilians
than continued reliance on the anti-discrimination provisions of the
penal code.
A. Constitutional Claims
Brazil's 1988 Constitution contains extensive provisions
protecting equality and prohibiting discrimination. Article 5 of the
Constitution begins by stating that "[aIll are equal before the law,
without distinction of any nature, guaranteeing to Brazilians and
foreigners resident in the country the inviolability of the right to life,
liberty, equality, security and property.., in the following
terms.... "2m Paragraph forty-one of Article 5 goes to adds that "the
law will punish any discrimination which would offend rights and
fundamental liberties," while I XLII states that the "practice of
racism constitutes an unbailable crime, subject to the punishment of
imprisonment, under the terms of the law."2 9
Brazilian courts have held that the general equality protections
of Article 5 are self-executing, even though the specific anti-
discrimination provisions of 1 XLI and XLII appear to require
implementation through criminal statutes.24°  Supreme Court
President, Marco Aiirelio Mello, has observed that "in relation to
rights and individual guarantees, the Constitution of 1988 became,
from when promulgated, self-executing., 24' However, constitutional
scholars Celso Ribeiro Bastos and Ives Gandra Martins describe 9
XLI's anti-discrimination provisions as "unequivocally not self-
238. C.F. art. 5 (translation by author).
239. Id. art 5 $ XLI, XLII.
240. E-mail from Marcos Paulo Verissimo, Professor, Escola de Direito de Sao
Paulo da Fundaqio Gettilio Vargas, to author (July 22, 2005 12:58:16 -0300) (on file
with author).
241. Mello, supra note 54, at 24.
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executing ... [being] among those that demand implementation. 241
However, unlike XLII, whose criminal provisions were brought into
effect by the Lei Ca6, XLI appears to lack, as of yet, any such
implementing legislation.
Additionally, Article 7 91 XXX of the Constitution, which
addresses economic rights, prohibits "difference of salary, exercise of
functions, and criteria of admission for motive of sex, age, color or
civil status. 2 43 While Law 9.029 of 1995 provides for at least partial
implementation of I XXX, it clearly does not exhaust the potential
reach of the prohibition. However, in cases addressing age bias the
Supreme Federal Court has treated XXX as self-executing, lending
support to those who assert that direct racial discrimination claims
can be made as well.
24
Bringing litigation under the Constitution's equality provisions
may make available the kind of burden shifting analysis that can
reach a broader range of discriminatory practices than the Lei Ca6.
In considering constitutional claims by employees alleging age and
gender bias, courts have considered the "reasonableness" of the
challenged practices by using a test that considers their consistency
with the Constitution's equality provisions. 5  Since the same
constitutional provisions also address, discrimination on the basis of
race and color, it would seem appropriate for the courts to apply this
test more widely than they have to date.
Moreover Hddio Silva argues that in adopting ILO Convention
111, Brazil accepted a definition of racial discrimination that
encompasses facially neutral practices that have a disparate impact on
racial minorities. According to Silva, Convention 111 is enforceable
by Brazil's domestic courts by virtue of Article 5 of the Constitution
which states that "the rights and guarantees expressed in this
Constitution do not exclude others flowing.., from international
treaties to which the Federal Republic of Brazil is party.''246 Because
Convention 111 defines discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion
or preference made on the basis of race, colour,... which has the
effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment
242. Bastos and Martins, supra note 28, at 217.
243. C.F. art. 7 XXX.
244. See, e.g., R.M.S. 21.046, Relator: Min. Septilveda Pertence, D.J.U.
11.14.1991; Bertulio, supra note 112, at 95.
245. Racusen, supra note 8, at 98.
246. Silva, supra note 76, at 388; C.F. art. 5 §2.
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in employment or occupation,"247 Silva claims it has "introduced into
the [legal] order the modality of objective civil responsibility for racial
discrimination."2" Correct application of Convention 111, says Silva,
means that "the discriminated person... is relieved of proving that
intangible, cunning and concealed subjective element, the intent to
discriminate." '249 According to this argument, under Convention 111
Brazilian law already permits disparate impact analysis.
While the courts have yet to adopt this particular approach, there
are already some indications that bringing civil suits based on
constitutional claims is a viable route for Afro-Brazilians to assert
employment discrimination claims. In two well-publicized cases in
1995 and 2001, Afro-Brazilian public employees won rulings in
Brazilian labor courts that racially discriminatory terminations had
violated their constitutional rights."0 In both cases, the plaintiffs'
claims initially had been rejected for failure to show the prejudicial
motives of their employers. However, on appeal, the courts relaxed
the evidentiary requirements and held that discrimination had been
established despite lack of direct proof of specific intent. Similarly, in
two more recent cases, Afro-Brazilian workers in the private sector
brought successful constitutional claims against their employers for
racial harassment in the workplace.
In Eletrosul, the 1995 case that was the subject of the film, "The
Rule and the Exception," the plaintiff was an Afro-Brazilian engineer
who was laid-off from a public utility company shortly after his
supervisor said, "let's clean up the department and fire that crioulo
[Creole]."25 While the engineer initially sought to bring a criminal
complaint under the Lei Ca6, public prosecutors refused to file
charges, accepting the company's claim that the layoff was not racially
motivated. 2 The engineer subsequently filed a civil suit in the labor
courts claiming that the termination was unconstitutional. While the
claim was rejected by the court of first instance, on appeal, the
regional labor court held that it was unnecessary to show "the
motivation of the dismissal to be definitely racist" and instead
247. ILO No. 111, art. 1 §1(a) (emphasis added).
248. Silva, supra note 76, at 379.
249. Id.
250. However, the more recent ruling was subsequently reversed. See infra at
312.
251. Racusen, supra note 8, at 306.
252. Id. (discussing Inquerito Policial No. 596/92, 3d Vara Criminal, Estado de
Santa Catarina).
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"scrutinized the firm's dismissal process to ask if this was an
unjustified dismissal."" 3  Concluding that this process was
"discretionary with likely racial motivations," the appellate court
ordered the plaintiff's reinstatement, 2'4 a ruling that was subsequently
upheld by the country's highest labor court, the Tribunal Superior do
Trabalho (TST). 5
Similarly, in the 2001 case of de Souza v. SENAI, the TST
awarded reinstatement and damages to a teacher in a government
apprenticeship program whose supervisor had harassed him and
called him a "'worthless Black' who should return to the tronco (slave
quarters). '' 6 The lower court rejected the plaintiff's claim, accepting
the defendant's argument that the supervisor's statement only
reflected his personal animosity towards the plaintiff and not a
racially discriminatory motive for the plaintiff's termination."'
However, the TST accepted the plaintiff's appeal and ruled in his
favor, holding that the supervisor's "numerous documented acts
demonstrated... [his] prejudicial motive" and that this was
"responsible for [the plaintiff's] ... reassignment and dismissal., 21
In its decision in favor of the plaintiff, the TST cited both
constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination and Brazil's
adoption of ILO Conventions 111 and 117.259 The court appeared to
recognize that some form of burden shifting was appropriate. The
TST held that, because of "the social aspects involved" in the case,
the defendant employer had "objective responsibility" for the
discriminatory acts of its supervisor, even if at the time of the
plaintiff's termination the employer was not aware of those
discriminatory acts.260 However, on rehearing by a specialized panel
of the court, the TST reversed itself and reinstated the lower court's
ruling, finding that since "the acts considered discriminatory did not
253. Racusen, supra note 8, at 307-8, discussing Processo No. 0412/92, Poder
Judiciario, Justiqa do Trabalho, 12e Regido (1995).
254. Id. at 308.
255. Fry, supra note 95, at 187.
256. Racusen, supra note 8, at 309.
257. Id. (discussing Recurso Ordinario No. 16.680/96, 3a Turma, Tribunal
Regional do Trabalho da 3a Regido).
258. Racusen, supra note 8, at 309 (discussing TST-ED-RR-381.531/97.8,
01.12.2001).
259. Convention concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy, entered
into force April 23, 1964 [hereinafter ILO No. 117]; Racusen, supra note 8, at 310.
260. Press Release, Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, TST realiza julgamento
inrdito sobre demissao por racismo (Sept. 16, 2003), discussing E-RR 38.1531/1997
(translation by author), <http://www.tst.gov.br/>.
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extend beyond the personal relationship of the employee with his
immediate supervisor, they cannot be attributed to the employer who
lacked knowledge of them."261 Notably, Justice Carlos Alberto Reis
de Paula, the first Afro-Brazilian to serve on the TST, dissented from
the majority's decision to reverse.262
Under Brazilian law, employment discrimination claims based on
the constitutional guarantee of "equality before the law" are not
restricted to public sector workers, but may also be brought by
employees of private firms. In the 2001 case of Mylene Pereira Ramos
v. McDonald's, an Afro-Brazilian food service worker in Sdo Paulo
successfully brought suit after her supervisor called her a "smelly
black woman" and told her that her skin color made her a poor
employee. 263 Although by U.S. standards, the supervisor's conduct
might not have been sufficient to create liability, the Brazilian court
awarded "moral damages" based on a violation of constitutional
equality guarantees. 26'
Similarly, a 2005 ruling by the TST affirmed a lower court
decision awarding damages to an Afro-Brazilian electrician who was
subjected to repeated racial insults by his supervisor.26" In his opinion,
which also cited both the Constitution and ILO Convention 111, Joao
Oreste Dalazen of the TST wrote that, "in a context where one notes
a global concern with eradicating discrimination, there remains no
room to tolerate the vexatious exposition to which the employee was
subjected because of his race." 266 Rejecting the company's claim that
remedial measures reduced its liability, the court observed that "the
Brazilian legal order and international norms.., prohibit to an
employer or any other persons the adoption of any practice that
implies prejudice or discrimination by virtue of race." 26
The bank employee lawsuits, which also were brought as
constitutional claims, have sought to break new ground in both the
261. Press Release, Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, Falta de provas livra Senai
de acusagdo de demissao por racismo (Dec. 4, 2003) (translation by author),
<http://www.tst.gov.br/>.
262. Id.
263. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 9, discussing Sao Paulo Labor Court District
31, Case No. 562/02 (2002).
264. Id. at 10.
265. Dano Moral: Parmalat tem de indenizar empregado chamado de chipanzg,
CONSULTOR JURiDICO (Aug. 12, 2005), http://conjur.estadao.com.br/, discussing Rio
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theories of discrimination that courts entertain and the kind of
burden-shifting procedure they apply in such cases. The litigation
marks the first time in Brazil that a discrimination claim has been
brought solely on statistical evidence.26 In the first of these suits to
reach hearing, a labor court judge appeared to accept the argument
that liability could be established based on this theory. He concluded
that the evidence gave "vehement indications of discrimination in the
employment policy of the defendant banks.,
269
Moreover, the language of the judge in this case suggests a
willingness to consider a broader range of theories of discrimination
than are typically applied by Brazilian courts. The court indicated
that the Constitution's equality provisions require shifting the burden
of proof to defendants. The judge observed that "in the fundamental
principal of equality, expressed in various constitutional and
international dispositions.., we find ourselves facing an objective
situation of inversion of the burden of proof., 270 The judge then held
that "the defendant is responsible for proving completely that, despite
the evidence put forward by the plaintiff, it did not commit any
violation of the fundamental principal of equality, in its various
species."271' This approach is striking in comparison to jurisprudence
under the Lei Ca6, in both in the court's openness to holding an
employer liable without evidence of prejudicial intent, and its
resulting willingness to shift the burden of proof.
While these cases demonstrate some of the advantages of
bringing employment discrimination suits as constitutional claims,
significant obstacles to such litigation still exist. Plaintiffs will have to
secure their own resources for investigation and litigation in lieu of
the assistance provided to crime victims by police and public
prosecutors. Moreover, unsuccessful plaintiffs may have to pay the
opposing side's legal fees.2 2 Finally, would-be plaintiffs may have few
places to turn to for assistance; few of the organizations affiliated with
the Black Movement specialize in litigation and those that do tend to
focus on highly visible cases, particularly those addressing racial bias
in the media."3
268. Press Release, Minist6rio Piblico do Trabalho, supra note 2.
269. Press Release, Ministdrio Ptiblico do Trabalho, Combate A discriminaqdo
no trabalho (Dec. 13, 2005), <http://www.mpt.gov.br/>.
270. Id.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. Bermudes, supra note 205.
273. Telles, supra note 10, at 241, 247.
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Also, as Racusen observes, Brazilian courts have, until recently,
resisted using burden shifting when the plaintiff's allegations deal
with racial discrimination.274 However, even if courts ultimately do
not adopt the theory of discrimination based on statistical evidence
that has been asserted in the bank employee litigation, the more
limited burden-shifting employed in the Eletrosul and SENAI cases
seems likely to produce a more favorable jurisprudence than has
developed under the Lei Ca6.
B. Labor Law
Another disadvantage of treating racial discrimination as a
criminal offense is that it hinders Afro-Brazilian workers from
bringing such claims through the country's highly accessible and
relatively plaintiff-friendly labor law system. While Brazil's anti-
discrimination law appears relatively underdeveloped compared to its
U.S. counterpart, its labor law is far "thicker," appearing almost
hypertrophied in its breadth and specificity.275 While Brazilian law
incorporates a rather narrow understanding of racial discrimination,
its labor law reflects a broad conception of legal rights related to
class.276 Although adjudication of racial discrimination cases in the
criminal courts poses significant obstacles for Afro-Brazilian
employees, the country's system of labor tribunals provides a highly
accessible forum for redress of workplace problems.277
The underdevelopment of Brazil's anti-discrimination law in
contrast to its labor law may be another reflection of class over race
in Brazilian legal and political culture. Brazil's labor code, the
Consolidaqdo das Leis Trabalhistas ("CLT"), has been described as
the "world's most advanced labor legislation. . It is a "highly
structured minutely regulated" code that "provides guidance on
almost all important aspects of the world of work" as well as
274. Racusen, supra note 8, at 99.
275. This disparity is apparent in Brazilian legal scholarship as well. While there
appear to be only a handful of published works that discuss the law's treatment of
racial discrimination in employment, scholarly literature concerning the labor code
reportedly makes up the majority of all published Brazilian legal texts. French,
DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 2.
276. Id. at 40-1.
277. Fragale, supra note 230, at 292.
278. French, DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 1, citing KENNETH ERICKSON,
CORPORATISM AND LABOR IN DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL: ISSUES IN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 146 (Rosenbaum and Tyler, eds. 1972).
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addressing "hundreds of secondary questions large and small."279
Unlike the anti-discrimination law, which exempts the most prevalent
forms of discrimination, Brazil's labor laws heavily "judicialize" the
workplace, making nearly every aspect of the employment
relationship the source of an actionable legal right. Moreover, the
labor law permits plaintiffs to seek compensation for "moral injury"
as well as economic losses, with the result that racial insult - the
most frequent source of workplace discrimination claims - can, by
itself, provide the basis for liability.m
Under the CLT, Brazil has established a nationwide system of
labor courts that are "characterized by ease of access, informality,
speed and low cost. ' ' These courts are widely perceived to be more
sympathetic to ordinary citizens than the regular civil and criminal
courts.m While individual employees may bring claims pro se,
professional representation is readily available to plaintiffs as a
benefit of union membership.8 3 Significantly, the labor law allows
judges to shift the burden of proof from employee to employer when
evidence is difficult for workers to obtain.' Moreover, because the
law establishes a presumption of continuity of employment, burden
shifting is mandatory in unfair discharge cases, which make up the
largest category of claims.8 5
Brazilian employees are well accustomed to defending their
interests in court. The emergence since the late 1970s of vigorous
independent trade unions that mobilize and assist workers in
asserting their rights has led to a dramatic increase in claims.' Over
the past half century, the docket of the labor courts has continued to
expand nearly exponentially, from 37,530 filings in 1954 to 157,628 in
1974, and to the point where in 1997 the number of cases reaching
279. French, DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 1, 40.
280. Maria Aparecida Gugel, 0 Dano Moral Difuso e Coletivo na Justiqa do
Trabalho in Desafios do Direito do Trabalho 127-5 (Jairo Sento-S6 ed., Sao Paulo:
Ltr Editora 2000).
281. Fragale, supra note 230, at 292.
282. Racusen, supra note 8, at 303.
283. Brazilian labor law establishes a system of mandatory union representation
financed by a payroll tax remitted by the government to labor organizations, though
access to legal services is usually limited only to those workers who pay an additional
voluntary membership fee. Fragale, supra note 230, at 292-3.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. French, DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 102.
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final adjudication reached 2.4 million."
The greater availability of compensation through the labor law
system, particularly in cases of discriminatory discharge, is another
factor that explains the relative lack of recourse to anti-discrimination
law by Afro-Brazilian workers. Under the CLT, terminated
employees are entitled to severance payment in an amount that
depends on their length of service and whether or not the employer
can establish just cause.2 When the difficulty of establishing liability
under the anti-discrimination statutes is compared to the presumption
of employer liability and the assurance of some compensation under
the labor laws, it is not surprising that workers choose the latter even
if it means allowing employers to escape sanctions.
However, until recently, this otherwise all-encompassing legal
regime failed to include specific remedies for discrimination in the
workplace. It was only in 1999 that the CLT was amended to prohibit
the forms of employment discrimination already addressed by the
Constitution and Law 9.029."' In its current form, however, the Labor
Code now provides, on paper at least, extensive protections against
racial discrimination. The 1999 amendments make it a violation of
the CLT for employers to consider sex, age, color or marital status as:
(1) a qualification for hiring; (2) a reason for termination or denying
promotion; (3) a variable for determining compensation,
qualifications or opportunities for advancement; or (4) a criteria for
taking or passing job-related examinations. °
In sum, bringing discrimination lawsuits in the labor courts
appears to offer three main advantages over pursuing prosecution in
the criminal courts under the Lei Ca6. First, the burden-shifting
analysis typically applied by the labor courts may relieve employees
of having to prove their employer's discriminatory intent. Second, to
the extent that the Constitution's own equality and anti-
discrimination provisions are self-executing, the labor courts provide
a fairly accessible venue for workers to bring such claims. Third,
recourse to the labor courts may offer Afro-Brazilian workers greater
ability to control of their claims, avoiding the risk that their
complaints will be misconstrued by police or dropped by skeptical
prosecutors. Because the labor law system provides workers with
287. Id. Fragale, supra note 230, at 282.
288. Fragale, supra note 230, at 288-294.
289. Racusen, supra note 8, at 158 (discussing Lei No. 9.799, de 26 de Maio de
1999 [hereinafter Lei 9.799/99]).
290. Lei 9.799/99 at art 1.
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relatively easy access to counsel, this advantage may more than
compensate for the lack of assistance to complainants by public
authorities.'
However, despite these advantages, it is likely that the labor law
will be used to address racial discrimination in a fairly restricted range
of circumstances with limited deterrent effect on employers. First,
most Afro-Brazilians workers are employed in the informal economy,
and therefore, are not covered by the labor laws29 - though, the 1999
amendments should permit these workers to challenge discriminatory
hiring practices that bar access to formal sector jobs.
Second, workers typically use the labor law as a means of gaining
monetary compensation after they have been terminated from a job,
not as a tool to challenge unfair treatment in their current workplace.
Because the standard remedy under the CLT is to provide unjustly
terminated employees with severance pay, not reinstatement,
"workers tend not to complain about unlawful practices during the
employment period ... but are very active in the Labor Court after
they are fired... .,,293 This tendency is exacerbated by the labor law's
rather weak protections against employer retaliation, and the risk of
blacklisting by future employers.29 In this sense, race discrimination
claims are likely to be used as a form of unemployment insurance for
fired workers, but not as a way to change discriminatory workplace
practices.
Finally, existing jurisprudence under the Lei Ca6 may affect the
courts' treatment of discrimination claims brought under the CLT.
Racusen observes that when considering cases alleging racial
discrimination the labor courts have tended to require proof of
prejudicial motive and have not used the burden-shifting analysis they
otherwise apply.2 95 The successful constitutional claims discussed
earlier were initially lost in the lower labor courts, which ruled that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish liability. While the appellate
judges in these cases allowed discrimination to be shown by inference
291. In addition, public prosecutors in the labor courts may be more sympathetic
to racial discrimination claims than those in the general civil and criminal courts. See
infra at 167.
292. Amaury de Souza, Dilemma of Industrial Relations Reform: Learning from
Brazil's Interest Representation Experience, in COMPARING BRAZIL AND SOUTH
AFRICA, supra note 33, at 108.
293. French, DROWNING IN LAWS, supra note 15, at 104.
294. Id., Minist6rio Ptiblico do Trabalho, MPT combate elaborag~o e uso de
"listas negras", available at <www.mpt.gov.br/>.
295. Racusen, supra note 8, at 93, 99, 114.
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instead of direct evidence, they did not apply the "reasonableness"
standard that the labor courts often use in age and gender bias suits.2
Several other recent cases suggest the advantages of this kind of
litigation, as well as it limitations. In three decisions reported from
Sao Paulo labor courts in the last two years, judges have awarded
moral damages to Afro-Brazilian employees who had been subjected
to racial insult in the workplace 97 When compared to the bleak
record of attempts to hold employers liable under the Lei Afonso
Arinos and Lei Ca6, these cases further confirm that civil litigation
under the labor laws represents a viable strategy for challenging racial
discrimination. However, these cases suggest that such litigation only
will enable Afro-Brazilian workers to challenge the same explicit
forms of prejudice that the Lei Ca6 was intended to deter, but is
unlikely to address the more covert forms of discrimination that
perpetuate racial inequality.
C. Class Action
The agdo civil pablica, brought by NGO's and the Public Ministry,
would be an excellent instrument of combating this [discriminatory]
system... not only in education, but also in employment relations
and many others fields in which Brazil distinguishes itself by
insupportable injustice. It remains to be seen, however, if this




As Afro-Brazilian legal advocates and activists have shifted from
reliance on criminal prosecution to exploration of civil litigation for
challenging racial discrimination, they have increasingly considered
the possibility of using the country's distinctive forms of class action
296. Id. at 98.
297. Alvo de Preconceito, Empresa 9 condenada a indenizar mecdnico em R$ 48
mil por racismo, Consultor Juridico (Nov. 13, 2004), available at
<http://conjur.estadao.com.br/static/text/31190,1> (discussing la Vara do Trabalho de
Sdo Paulo, Recurso Ordindrio TRT/SP 01415.2003.001.02.00-7); McDonald's 6
condenado por racismo de gerente contra funciondria, Consultor Juridico (Jan. 30,
2005), available at <http://conjur.estadao.com.br/static/text/32655,1> (discussing la
Vara do Trabalho de Santo Andre/SP, Recurso Ordinirio 01495.2001.431.02.00-3);
Discriminaqdo Racial: Empresa 9 condenada a reparar funciondrio por racismo,
CONSULTOR JURfDICO (June 1, 2005), available at <http://conjur.estadao.com.br/
static/text/35145,1> (discussing 10a C mara do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 15a
Regiao, Recurso Ordinirio 01999-2003-048-15-00-3).
298. Gomes, supra note 23, at 400.
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law, the aqdo civil ptiblica (civil public action) and aqdo coletiva
(collective action). Brazil is unusual among civil law countries in
having adopted class actions over two decades ago, and such suits
already have been used extensively in the fields of consumer and
environmental protection. 299
While class actions appear to present unique advantages for
plaintiffs, until recently there have been no attempts to use them to
challenge racial discrimination against Afro-Brazilian workers. The
bank employee litigation discussed previously represents a major test
of this strategy. This section will consider the possible advantages
and risks of bringing employment discrimination claims as class
actions, and what factors explain the historical absence of such
litigation.
1. Brazilian Class Action Procedure
Brazilian class action law developed in the 1980s during the
country's democratic transition as a means to promote greater
accountability of government institutions and private corporations to
public interests.' The statutes that establish the two forms of
Brazilian class action, Law 7.347 of 1985 and Law 8.078 of 1990,
"amount, in effect to a code of class action procedure."' ' These two
forms of class action protect different types of interests: the civil
public action is concerned with "diffuse and collective rights" and the
collective action defends "homogenous individual rights."'  The
former is implicated where a defendant's actions affect a group as a
whole and damages cannot be apportioned among class members, the
latter when these actions produce distinct and measurable harms of
the same type to each class member. 3
Unlike environmental or consumer rights, the interests of
persons of a common ethnic background or employees in a common
industry are not mentioned specifically in the statute establishing the
civil public action. However, the law creates a right of action for
damages to "any other diffuse or collective interest."3 " Similarly,
299. Gidi, supra note 16, at 326, 332; Sadek and Cavalcanti, supra note 19, at 5
n.7.
300. Gidi, supra note 16, at 330-1.
301. Id. at 328; Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985 [hereinafter Lei 7.347/85];
Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990 [hereinafter Lei 8.078/90].
302. Id.
303. Id. at 350-60.
304. Lei 7.347/85 art. 1.
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even though the 1990 statute creating the collective action is entitled
the "Consumer Defense Code," it states that "the defense of the
interests and rights of consumers and victims will be able to exercised
in court.., by collective title."3 5 This indicates that claims can be
brought on behalf of any group of persons who have suffered
collective harms.3°6 Thus, under Brazilian law, "class action rules are
available to solve controversies in environmental, antitrust, torts, tax,
and any other branch of the law," including employment claims. 30,
For example, the lawsuits against the banks were brought as civil
public actions asserting injury to the interests of Afro-Brazilian,
female, and older employees from discrimination in hiring, promotion
and compensation."
The different interests protected by the civil public action and
the collective action gives rise to different statutory remedies.
Because the civil public action seeks to defend interests where it may
not be possible to identify a determinate class or else to apportion
damages among its members, the courts' preferred remedy in such
cases is injunctive relief.31 If the defendants have caused harms that
cannot be remedied by injunction, the court may order them to pay
damages, not to the class members directly, but to a fund supporting
remedial projects related to the harmed interests. 3° The bank
employee class actions seek $14.3 million from each defendant
financial institution to be used to remedy the "collective moral
damages" caused to Afro-Brazilian, female and older workers by the
banks' discriminatory practices. 31
In a collective action plaintiffs may seek either injunctive relief
or compensatory damages in the estimated sum of the harm to the
members of the class.3"2 If the suit is successful, the court enters a
declaratory judgment, but class members must then bring suit
individually to establish causality for the claims they personally
305. Lei 8.078/90 art. 81 (emphasis added).
306. Id.
307. Gidi, supra note 16, at 328; Nelson Nery, A Aqdo Civil Pfiblica no Processo
do Trabalho in A.Ao CIVIL POBLICA: LEI 7347/85 - 15 ANOs 605-611 (Edis Milard ed.
2002).
308. Press Release, Ministdrio Piblico do Trabalho, Eliminaqao da
discriminaq~o no trabalho (Sept. 12, 2005), <http://www.mpt.gov.br/>.
309. Gidi, supra note 16, at 355.
310. Id. at 339-340.
311. Press Release, supra note 308.
312. Hugo Nigro Mazzilli, A DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM Juizo 208
(Editora Revista dos Tribunais 3d ed.1990).
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assert.313 If in one year from the date of the judgment individual class
members have not claimed the full amount of the award, the court
may require the defendant to deposit the remainder in an account of
the same type mandated in the civil public action. 4
One distinct difference between Brazilian class action law and its
U.S. counterpart is that in Brazil standing is granted not to
representative members of the class, but to state and private
institutions authorized to defend the particular interests at stake. The
statute establishes the standing of the Public Ministry to bring by
itself, or intervene in, class actions to defend any type of interest
protected by the law.315 While individuals cannot bring class actions,
they do have the right to petition the Public Ministry to begin an
investigation that may lead to a class action by supplying facts
constituting the grounds for the action.316
Moreover, when public prosecutors or other government
authorities do participate in class actions, the law authorizes them to
resolve the suits through out of court settlements known as Termos de
Ajustamento de Conduta, ("TAC").317  Class actions help avoid
protracted litigation because Public Prosecutors can secure
settlements before a suit is filed by using their statutory investigative
powers.3 8 For example, in the bank employee lawsuits, public
prosecutors publicly proposed that the defendants settle the litigation
by negotiating specific deadlines and numerical targets for hiring,
promotion and salary adjustment of Afro-Brazilian, female and older
employees.319
The law also extends standing to private associations that have
been in existence for more than a year to bring class actions to protect
interests that are among their institutional objectives.32 Even where
the association has not been existence for a year prior to the filing of
the action, the court may relax this requirement for reasons of public
interest in the issues involved.32' Moreover, an association can assert
313. Id.; Gidi, supra note 16, at 359.
314. Gidi, supra note 16, at 360.
315. Lei 7.347/85 art. 5.
316. Id. art. 6.
317. Id. art. 5 §6.
318. R6gerio Bastos Arantes, MINISTtRIO POBLICO E POLITICA NO BRASIL 260,
(Ed. Sumar6/Educ/Fapesp 2002).
319. Press Release, Minist6rio Ptblico do Trabalho, Combate A discriminaqdo
no trabalho (Oct. 20, 2005), available at <http://www.mpt.gov.br/>.
320. Lei 7347/85 art. 5.
321. Id. art. 5 §4.
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standing even if the class members on whose behalf the suit is brought
are not actually affiliated with it.
3
2
Thus, a group of Afro-Brazilian workers seeking to challenge
racial discrimination by an employer could either petition the Public
Ministry to bring such a case, or enlist the support of an organization
that has among its institutional purposes protecting the collective
interest affected. Brazil's Constitution authorizes trade unions to
bring litigation to protect the collective interests of groups of workers
in their respective industries.3 Moreover, if a particular union does
not have the will or capacity to take legal action against racial
discrimination in its industry, workers could seek the help of a NGO
whose institutional objectives include protecting the interests of Afro-
Brazilian workers. 4
2. Advantages of Class Actions for Afro-Brazilian Workers
Brazilian class action law grants parties bringing such suits,
especially Public Prosecutors, significant advantages in establishing
the defendant's liability for the harms asserted. As previously
mentioned, Brazilian judges already are accustomed to employing
burden shifting in class actions.3  In the first of the bank employee
lawsuits to be heard, the judge, finding "an objective situation of
inversion of burden of proof," ordered the defendant bank to prove
that "despite the indicia [of discrimination] shown by the plaintiff, it
did not commit any violation of the fundamental principle of
equality .... ,326
Second, parties bringing class actions have a greater ability to
request production of evidence than other plaintiffs, a notable benefit
in a civil law system where pre-trial discovery is extremely limited.
The statute establishes that in order to prepare their complaints,
plaintiffs can "request to competent authorities certifications and
information that they judge necessary, to be furnished in a period of
fifteen days."32 Public prosecutors have even greater investigatory
powers, since the statute authorizes them to initiate a "civil
investigation" in which they can request from "any public or private
organization," "certification, information, or examination," to be
322. Gidi, supra note 16, at 374-375.
323. Mazzilli, supra note 312, at 110.
324. Nery, supra note 307, at 617.
325. Racusen, supra note 116, at 8, 12.
326. Press Release, Ministdrio Ptiblico do Trabalho, supra note 4.
327. Lei 7.347/85 art. 8 (translation by author).
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provided in ten days. In preparation for bringing the bank
employee class actions, prosecutors used their investigatory authority
to secure demographic, salary and occupational data from the
targeted financial institutions and equivalent data on local labor
markets from the government research institute, IBGE. 29  These
statistics, which they analyzed with assistance from another state
statistical agency, IPEA, provided the basis for its suits against the
banks.330
Brazilian class action procedure also has important features that
may enable plaintiffs to avoid some of the risks associated with
bringing discrimination claims on an individual basis. One is that the
statute creates an exception to the usual rule of "loser pays" by
exempting unsuccessful plaintiffs in civil public actions or collective
actions from having to reimburse the legal fees of the defendants
unless the court finds the action was brought in bad faith.3 Another
is that if a class action is dismissed on grounds of insufficient
evidence, it can be re-filed if new evidence is produced. 32
Additionally, class actions only have res judicata effect for members
of the class to the extent that the judgment benefits their interests.333
Therefore, even if the action is unsuccessful, class members still can
bring individual lawsuits asserting the same claim. 33'
Brazil's class action law may compensate for aspects of its labor
law that discourage the filing, and limit the impact, of discrimination
claims brought by individual workers. For example, the law confers
standing on institutional actors to bring employment discrimination
claims on behalf of workers who, as individual plaintiffs, would be left
vulnerable by the labor law's weak anti-retaliation provisions. In the
bank employee lawsuit, for instance, it would serve no purpose for
defendants to retaliate against Afro-Brazilian employees since the
litigation is being brought not by these workers but by public
prosecutors.
Similarly, the availability of injunctive relief may allow such suits
to be brought in direct response to discriminatory conduct, rather
than as post facto claims for severance benefits. And the remedies
328. Id. at § 1.
329. Press Release, Minist6rio Ptiblico do Trabalho, supra note 2.
330. Press Release, Minist6rio Ptiblico do Trabalho, supra note 1.
331. Lei 7.347/85 art. 18.
332. Gidi, supra note 16, at 392-393.
333. Id. at 388-389.
334. Id. at 390.
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achieved can benefit both current personnel instead of simply
compensating former employees.
Plaintiffs bringing class actions can seek a court order or a
settlement agreement requiring employers to reform their practices.
Such suits are-more likely to have a broaderand more lasting impact
on a particular firm or industry. Indeed, Gomes argues that TAC
settlements may be "more effective than judgments" in producing
institutional change since they allow the crafting of more
sophisticated remedies than a lower court judge is likely to impose.
Finally, the imposition of a damage award for the full amount of the
harm done to the entire plaintiff class, rather than that inflicted on
one individual employee, is more likely to convince a firm to reform
its practices.
Class actions also may alleviate the difficulty of establishing
liability in employment discrimination suits. The greater ability of
parties bringing class suits to require pre-trial production of
information makes it more likely that documentary evidence can be
obtained that may help show prejudicial intent. Also, asserting anti-
discrimination claims as class actions offers opportunities to re-litigate
should the initial suit be unable to establish liability. Especially in a
system that allows limited pre-trial discovery, having multiple chances
to litigate may increase the likelihood of securing a successful verdict
by creating more opportunities to secure evidence and develop facts
in court.
Class actions also remove some of the financial disincentives
against bringing civil litigation under Brazilian law. Since individuals
cannot bring class litigation on their own, the costs of bringing the suit
are borne by the public or private entity that asserts standing and not
the class members. Given the significant challenges involved in
developing more favorable jurisprudence on racial discrimination, the
exemption to the "loser pays" rule is vital for encouraging private
organizations to litigate class suits.
3. Possible Limitations of Brazilian Class Actions
Considering the apparent advantages to using class action
litigation to combat racial discrimination, it seems surprising that this
procedural device has not been used more widely in this arena.
However, one can identify certain features of Brazilian class action
that may hinder its application to such claims. Moreover, even should
335. Gomes, supra note 23, at 400.
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more class action litigation be brought on behalf of Afro-Brazilian
workers, other factors still may undermine its effectiveness as a tool
for achieving greater racial equality in the labor market.
It is important to recognize that discussion of the advantages of
class actions for bringing -anti-discrimination litigation in Brazilian
courts is somewhat speculative. The current bank employee litigation
appears to be the first in which class actions have been used to
challenge employment discrimination against Afro-Brazilians.
Writing in 2000, Justice Gomes expressed his frustration that "the
record of [successful] civil public actions in general is so squalid that
in the area of protection of minority rights there is nothing to
analyze!, 336 While Gomes blames institutional factors - mainly the
conservatism of the judiciary and the lack of resources devoted by the
Public Ministry to class action litigation - it seems likely that aspects
of the class action statutes themselves are at least partially
responsible.
Compared to the U.S. class action regime, Brazil's system of
collective legal representation heavily privileges institutional actors.
This may reduce the incentive for individuals to take an active role in
monitoring class litigation, even though they are its potential
beneficiaries. Moreover, although the class action laws confer
standing on private associations and entities, public prosecutors bring
an estimated 98 percent of all civil public actions and collective
actions.337 This statistic reflects the limited resources and legal
expertise available to most NGOs and other potential plaintiffs who,
rather than bring such actions themselves, typically petition the Public
Ministry to file a class suit on their behalf.338 Reliance on public
prosecutors also may reflect their superior powers to investigate,
engage in discovery, and reach settlements with defendants.
Moreover, while Brazilian law explicitly authorizes public
prosecutors to bring class actions to protect citizens from racial
discrimination, it does not make a clear grant of standing to private
institutions, like trade unions or NGOs. The organic law establishing
the Public Ministry specifically confers the power to "bring civil
public actions and civil investigations" for "the protection of...
336. Id. at 403.
337. Sadek and Cavalcanti, supra note 19, at 5 n.7.
338. Edesio Fernandes, Environmental Rights in Brazil in HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 281 (Alan Boyle and Michael
Anderson, eds. 1996).
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ethnic minorities." '339 However, while the class action law states that
private associations may bring civil public actions to defend "any...
diffuse or collective interest," protection of minorities, unlike
protection of the environment or consumers, is not listed specifically
as a cause of action. Thus the use of the civil public action to defend
the interests of Afro-Brazilians is authorized not under the class
action law itself, but instead as a statutory function of the Public
Ministry.
The lack of a clear statement authorizing private associations to
bring such claims is of some concern, because some judges may be
reluctant to recognize protection of Afro-Brazilians from racial
discrimination as a legitimate collective interest. Justice Gomes has
expressed worry that "fg]iven the overwhelming predominance of a
conservative vision among Brazilian legal scholars, the eventual rise
of a current of thought tending to disqualify ethno-racial factors as a
legitimate element of standing for the civil public action would not be
a surprise.""34 Such concerns are not without basis. In a 1993 civil
public action brought by public prosecutors and Geledes, a Black
Movement NGO, which asserted injuries to Afro-Brazilian
consumers from racist advertising, one judge filed a dissenting
opinion arguing that standing should be denied, because "in a country
like ours," "the theme of injury or affront to theblack race must be
seen.., as speculation." 34'
Moreover, while the standing of trade unions to bring suit on
behalf of their members is well established,3 2 the law places potential
obstacles in the way of unions litigating discrimination claims on
behalf of Afro-Brazilian workers. Because the law requires unions
whose by-laws do not specifically authorize the organization to bring
lawsuits on behalf of their members to gain approval from the rank-
and-file before filing such actions, it is possible that employees
benefiting from discriminatory practices might resist this type of
initiatives. Brazilian trade unions tend to be relatively wealthy
compared to NGOs since they benefit from a compulsory "trade
union tax" on employees. Because of this, their leaders may be
reluctant to devote political capital to pursuing litigation that is
divisive for their membership. Rebecca Reichmann's survey of
339. Gomes, supra note 23, at 395.
340. Id.
341. Racusen, supra note 116, at 23.
342. Amaury Mascaro Nascimento, History of Labor Law in Brazil in A
PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 258 (Jacob Dolinger and Keith Rosenn, eds. 1992).
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Brazilian trade unionists found that while over 55 percent of Afro-
Brazilian labor activists she interviewed supported affirmative action
programs, only 32 percent of their white counterparts felt similarly.343
A related barrier to such suits may be that, unlike under the U.S.
system, individual Afro-Brazilian workers cannot bring class actions
on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees.
Moreover, even if a collective action is successful, individual class
members must bring suit for execution of the judgment in order to
recover damages." These restrictions, combined with the relatively
limited damage and fee awards issued by Brazilian courts, limit the
incentives for private attorneys to litigate class actions.345 Along with
the tendency of potential plaintiffs to defer to public prosecutors to
bring such suits, these obstacles help explain the absence in Brazil of
an entrepreneurial class action bar, an institution that has played an
important role in the development of such litigation in the United
States.
The relatively marginal role of both private attorneys and non-
governmental institutions in Brazilian class actions may be hindering
their development as an "instrument of juridical combat." U.S.
scholars have suggested that "the failure of the Brazilian legal system
to develop strong incentives for private suits by victims of alleged
discrimination in employment and other areas," is, in part,
responsible for the weakness of the country's civil rights regime.346
Public Prosecutors' near monopolization of Brazilian class action
practice means that it is their priorities and preferences - not those
of NGOs or private attorneys - that determine the types and
strategies of class action pursued in the courts. Relying solely on
prosecutors to bring class actions may be disadvantageous for the
development of a more effective anti-discrimination law regime, since
this process may require considerable experimentation and thus could
benefit from the participation of a wider group of litigators.
Finally, Brazilian class action law contains relatively weak
mechanisms to ensure that such suits actually will advance the
interests of Afro-Brazilian workers. Aside from its restrictions on
standing, the law does not require courts to determine whether
parties bringing a civil public or collective action adequately
343. Reichmann, supra note 38, at 21.
344. Gidi, supra note 16, at 359.
345. Id. at 319-320.
346. Cottrol, supra note 129, at 75; Hernandez, supra note 84, at 1129.
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represent the interests of the class. 7 Moreover the only provision for
class notice is requirement that an announcement of the suit be
published in the official organ of the state. 8 The result is that an
individual on whose behalf an action is brought may have little ability
to influence the remedies sought or whether to settle.
The justification for this absence of procedural safeguards is the
lack of prejudicial res judicata effect of the class action on subsequent
individual claims by class members.' 9 However, unless a class claim
fails for lack of sufficient evidence, a contrary judgment does preclude
successive attempts to bring it again on a class basis.35 Therefore
litigation that fails to secure effective remedies may harm future
efforts to address systemic problems.
Not surprisingly, Brazilian class action law seems vulnerable to
some of the same criticisms leveled at the U.S. class action system.
Those prosecuting class actions, whether Public Prosecutors, trade
unions or NGOs, may, in pursuit of their own institutional aims,
neglect the actual preferences of class members.35 On the other hand,
by using the TAC settlements mechanism in order to avoid drawn-out
litigation,352 Public Prosecutors may fail to fully vindicate the legal
rights of Afro-Brazilian workers.353
Even though Brazil has a civil law system, its Federal Supreme
Court has adopted the practice of issuing in some cases the stimula
vinculante, a precedential interpretation of the law that is binding on
the lower courts. The court has issued at least one simula
interpreting the Constitution's equality provisions as they apply to
maximum age limits for taking civil service examinations. However,
no such precedential ruling appears to have been issued on any
question of discrimination in regard to race.35' To the extent that
settlement of litigation forgoes the opportunity to establish such
precedents, it may impede the development of anti-discrimination law
as well.
347. Gidi, supra note 16, at 367.
348. Id. at 341-342.
349. Id. at 389.
350. Id.
351. Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
352. Arantes, supra note 318, at 89.
353. Owen Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
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Public Prosecutors may reach inadequate settlements with
defendants not because of financial self-interest, as has been charged
against the private class action bar in the U.S., 5' but because litigating
such cases to judgment may not be a priority.356 In the bank employee
class actions, this risk was mitigated because the workers' union has
taken an active role in challenging racial discrimination and is likely
to closely monitor the litigation. "' However, unions in other sectors
may be less attentive or may even oppose litigation that threatens the
privileges of their existing members.
VI. Legal Institutions and Anti-discrimination Law
It is saddening to see how such aggression to human dignity...
touches the sensitivities of so few judges, prosecutors, lawyers and
police.358
- Jorge da Silva
Another factor cited by both Brazilian and foreign observers to
explain the legal system's failure to address effectively racial
discrimination has been the inadequate performance in this area of its
key institutional actors, including judges, public prosecutors, police
and the private bar. In 2004, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination observed that "despite widespread
occurrences of... discrimination, the relevant domestic legal
provisions against racial crimes are rarely applied." '359 The Committee
recommended that the Brazilian government "improve awareness
and training regarding the existence and treatment of racist crimes on
the part of persons engaged in the administration of justice .... .""
While the judiciary and police forces have been most criticized in this
regard, given the central role played by the Public Prosecutors in
both criminal cases and class actions, their unwillingness - until
recently - to prioritize this issue bears attention as well.
Because treating racial discrimination as a criminal offense
places law enforcement officers as "gatekeepers" for these claims,
355. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement,
82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
356. IDESP, supra note 6.
357. Adami, supra note 58.
358. da Silva, supra note 70, at 172.
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police treatment of Afro-Brazilians in general, and discrimination
complainants in particular, also has restricted recourse to the judicial
system. Similarly, in evaluating the viability of civil discrimination
litigation, the limited availability of private counsel who are willing
and able to bring such claims may be another constraint on the law's
effectiveness.
The striking lack of litigation by Afro-Brazilians challenging
racial discrimination demonstrates in part a well-founded lack of
confidence in the courts. The lingering resistance of judges and other
legal actors to race discrimination claims is particularly noticeable
because in the last decade there has been a remarkable
transformation in the treatment of racial issues by other elements of
the Brazilian state. Since the mid-1990s, the Black Movement has
been successful in pressing the executive and legislative branches to
recognize that racial inequality is an important social problem and to
expand educational and employment opportunities for Afro-
Brazilians. The comparative failure of the judiciary to make a similar
break with the past may reflect its relative independence and
insulation from the forms of pressure that the Black Movement has
used to engage other state institutions. In this sense, the
underdevelopment of Brazilian anti-discrimination law may also
reflect Afro-Brazilian activists' conscious choice to focus their efforts
away from the courts and towards state actors that have been more
responsive to their claims.
A. The Judiciary
Some scholars have suggested that jurisprudence on
discrimination against Afro-Brazilians reflects the continued
influence of the racial democracy thesis over the Brazilian judiciary.
Guimardes writes of a gap between current Brazilian "sociological
thinking" on issues of race and the attitudes among the judiciary,
which "still remain[s] attached to the intellectual consensus of
[Gilberto] Freyre" - i.e., racial democracy.36 ' Similarly, Medeiros
suggests that having been "raised in the culture of racial democracy,"
Brazilian judges are "prone to discounting racial discrimination as
infrequent and unimportant," and therefore are unwilling to impose
the anti-discrimination law's criminal penalties on defendants. 32 Da
Silva cites a case of a judge who, after dismissing a complaint brought
361. Guimaraes, supra note 17, at 174.
362. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 121.
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under the Lei Ca6, went so far as to instruct the civil police
instructing to "take precaution[s], that, [future cases with] facts like
those of this accusation... be avoided.,
363
These attitudes also may explain judicial resistance in this area to
procedural methods that are used to facilitate other rights-based
claims. According to Racusen, judges have been less willing to apply
burden shifting in constitutional claims alleging race discrimination
than in those asserting age or gender bias.3" Similarly, Justice Gomes
has expressed his fear that the "predominan[t] ... conservative vision
among Brazilian legal scholars" may lead Brazilian judges to
"disqualify ethno-racial factors as a legitimate element of standing for
the civil public action."365
The judiciary's treatment of discrimination claims brought by
Afro-Brazilians is often attributed to a more traditional attitude
towards race among some Brazilian legal scholars than that which
currently prevails in other academic fields, such as sociology and
economics."" Brazilian judges are members of a career bureaucracy
who typically join the bench shortly after law school and have little
other academic or professional experience. Moreover, the social
origins and career trajectories of Brazilian judges may make them
predisposed towards continued acceptance of the racial democracy
thesis.
The current Brazilian judiciary combines what researchers have
described as "intense social mobility" in the class background of its
members, along with occupational segregation in terms of race.367 A
landmark 1997 survey of Brazilian judges found that 54 percent had
fathers with only a primary education. 68 It also showed that judges
entering the profession during the 1990s were much more likely than
their predecessors to have attended less prestigious private law
schools and to have taken night classes, both indications of less-
privileged backgrounds.369
Nevertheless, the Brazilian judiciary also remains
363. da Silva, supra note 70, at 167.
364. Racusen, supra note 8, at 99.
365. Gomes, supra note 23, at 395.
366. Elisa Larkin Nascimento, It's in the Blood: Notes on Race Attitudes in Brazil
from a Different Perspective, in BEYOND RACISM, supra note 17, at 517.
367. Luiz Wernneck Vianna, Maria Alice Rezende de Carvalho, Manuel
Paldcios Cunha Melo e Marcelo Baumann Burgos, Corpo e Alma da Magistratura
Brasileira 7 (1997).
368. Id. at 101.
369. Id. at 176.
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overwhelmingly white. Reflecting the striking inattention to issues of
race in Brazil legal academia, the 1997 survey - which recorded a
wealth of demographic detail about Brazilian judges (grandfather's
occupation, etc.) - did not even query about their race. However,
Gomes anecdotally suggests that Afro-Brazilians make up less than 2
percent of the federal judiciary.370
These statistics begin to explain why racial democracy may have
a particularly strong grasp on the Brazilian judiciary. As members of
a meritocratic bureaucracy who have experienced considerable
upward mobility, the idea that their advancement is due to their own
abilities and not privilege accruing from race may hold particular
appeal. The racial democracy thesis, which contends not only that
racial discrimination is not a significant problem in Brazil, but also
that they, personally, by virtue of being Brazilians, are incapable of
racial prejudice towards plaintiffs and defendants, seems likely to
validate Brazilian judges' sense of themselves as fair and impartial.37'
B. Public Prosecutors
Upward social mobility combined with overwhelming racial
homogeneity also describes Brazil's public prosecutors. A 1996
survey of members of the Federal Public Ministry, which likewise did
not ask their race, showed that a majority had parents without
university degrees or links to the legal professions, and over 70
percent had achieved higher education and income levels than their
parents.37  By contrast, Gomes reports anecdotally that barely 1
percent of federal prosecutors are Afro-Brazilians.373
The Constitution of 1988 granted to the Public Ministry an
extreme degree of autonomy, leading some scholars to speak of it as
virtually a "fourth branch" of government. This autonomy is
mirrored inside the institution by the large measure of functional
370. Gomes, supra note 23, at 408, n. 15.
371. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A
Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach, 63 LA. L. REV. 875, 877 (2003), citing
Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,380 (1987).
372. Ela Wieck V. de Castilho and Maria Tereza Sadek, 0 Minist6rio Piblico
Federal e a Administraqdo da Justiqa no Brasil 9-10 (1998).
373. Gomes, supra note 23, at 408, n. 15.
374. C.F. art. 127; Cf. Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior, 0 Quarto Poder e o
Terceiro Setor: 0 Ministrio Pfiblico e as Organizaq6es No Governmentais sem Fins
Lucrativos - Estrat~gias para o Futuro, in MINISTtRIO POBLICO I: DEMOCRACIA 248
(Josd Marcelo Menezes Vigiliar & Ronaldo Porto Macedo Jnior, eds., 1999).
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independence afforded to individual prosecutors.75  Decisions by
ministry officials and individual prosecutors about where to focus
their efforts are very significant factors in determining how
aggressively cases are investigated and litigated.376
However, perhaps because its top officers are still appointed by
the executive branch, and because individual prosecutors have
become increasingly politicized over the past two decades, the Public
Ministry has shown a noticeable responsiveness to agenda setting by
the executive and legislative branches.77 Public Prosecutors have
developed a new profile as the country's leading public interest
litigators, and have come to see themselves as active allies of
Brazilian civil society.378 As trade unions, human rights groups and
other elements of civil society awake to the issue of racial
discrimination, prosecutor's attitudes appear to be shifting
significantly as well.
Despite the fact that the Public Ministry is authorized by statute
to bring class actions to "protect ethnic minorities," until the late
1990s public prosecutors considered such cases a low priority.379 In a
1998 survey of federal prosecutors, only 8 percent of prosecutors
reported that they had made protection of ethnic minorities a priority
in the past two years and only 21 percent said that it would be a
priority in the two years to come.38 This was the lowest rating given
by prosecutors to any area of litigation or law enforcement - trailing
381behind even the protection of cultural and historic monuments:
These attitudes appear to have affected prosecutors' treatment of
discrimination complaints, as evidenced by Racusen's study from the
mid-1990s, which is replete with examples of prosecutors dropping
charges in cases involving blatant displays of racial animus."
Such attitudes also reflect a general institutional reluctance to
devote resources to cases involving racial discrimination. Following
the introduction of class actions in 1985, the Public Ministry
established dedicated divisions for bringing environmental, consumer,
disability, and investor protection litigation. Until recently, though,
375. C.F. art. 128.
376. Sadek and Cavalcanti, supra note 19, at 7.
377. Id. at 7-8, 12.
378. Macedo, supra note 374, at 256-8.
379. Gomes, supra note 23, at 395.
380. IDESP, supra note 6, at 15.
381. Id.
382. Cf. Racusen, supra note 8, at 27, 298, 299, 306.
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offices devoted to racial discrimination cases remained the exception
rather than the rule.383 However, such facilities have gradually
expanded, and in 2001 a working group on racial discrimination was
established within the Public Ministry at the federal level.
Reflecting the strategy adopted by both Brazilian prosecutors
and NGOs of pursuing highly visible cases that have "pedagogical"
value for the public,3  the Ministry appears to have put most of its
emphasis on prosecuting racist communications in the public media,
from advertising playing on ethnic stereotypes to the sale of neo-Nazi
publications. 5 While such prosecutions may be justified by their
deterrent and consciousness-raising effects, they may also to reinforce
the notion that discrimination predominately manifests itself in
explicit forms.
Lending further support to the argument that use of labor law
may offer a promising avenue for bringing racial discrimination
claims, members of the Public Ministry's labor branch, the Ministdrio
Piblico do Trabalho ("MPT"), have been notably more aggressive
than other public prosecutors. There may be several reasons why this
is the case. Besides the fact that employment is where Afro-
Brazilians feel the effects of discrimination most strongly, the MPT is
explicitly mandated by statute to "remove any type of discrimination
in relations between employers and workers."3"6
However, the MPT also appears to have among its ranks a
greater proportion of prosecutors who are likely to be receptive to
such claims. Reportedly, more than 10 percent of the candidates who
pass the civil service examination to join the MPT are Afro-Brazilian,
giving it a much more diverse profile than the Ministry's other
branches.387
In 2002, the MPT established an internal network entitled the
"National Coordination for the Promotion of Equality and
Elimination of Discrimination at Work."3" This network has a
specific focus on racial discrimination."' Early results have been well-
383. Guimar~es, supra note 17, at 174; Mazzilli, supra note 312, at 114.
384. Arantes, supra note 318, at 145; Carneiro, supra note 215, at 135.
385. Racusen, supra note 8, at 82.
386. Soares, supra note 53, at 81.
387. Vladirene Silva de Assis, Aqtes afirmativas para promoqdo da igualdade
material in DISCRIMINAAO E SISTEMA LEGAL, supra note 54, at 50.
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publicized investigations into racial discriminatory hiring by
restaurants and shopping malls in Bahia and successful settlements
with newspapers in Paraiba that had published job listings with
racially discriminatory requirements.3" Moreover, in the last year the
MPT has launched a "Program of Promotion of Equality and
Opportunity for All" headed by its second highest-ranking
prosecutor, one of whose pilot projects is the bank employee class
action.39 ' The stated objective of this effort is to increase the
representation, status and remuneration of Afro-Brazilians and
women employed in key economic sectors to reflect their actual
presence in the broader labor market.3"
C. Police
While the MPT's growing attention to the issue of racial
discrimination may facilitate recourse to the labor courts by Afro-
Brazilians, the role of police as "gatekeepers" for complaints brought
under the Lei Ca6 may be having the opposite effect on the use of the
criminal courts to challenge racial prejudice. Even though many of
their personnel are Afro-Brazilian, the police are commonly
393perceived as hostile and suspicious toward blacks and the poor.
Afro-Brazilians may fear that if they bring a complaint to the police,
the allegation will be turned against them since, according to the logic
of racial democracy, anyone who raises the issue of discrimination is
being "racist" themselves.394 For their part, police officers, who are
accustomed to viewing Afro-Brazilians stereotypically as criminal
suspects and dealing with business owners mostly as complainants,
may find a reversal of roles difficult to accept.
Even when complaints of racial discrimination are filed by Afro-
Brazilians, the results of police involvement often frustrate victims'
initiative. Racusen's research from the mid-1990s indicates that even
police specifically tasked with handling racial crimes tended to
misconstrue such complaints as defamation claims. 395  Although
greater attention to the issue of racial discrimination has resulted in
more training for the police in this area, it is likely that the mistrust by
390. Id.
391. Press Release, Ministdrio Ptiblico do Trabalho, Combate A discriminaqo
no trabalho (May 23, 2005), available at <http://www.mpt.gov.br/>.
392. Id.
393. Fry, supra note 95, at 188-9; Buckley, supra note 18, at A12.
394. Racusen, supra note 8, at 20.
395. Id. at 205.
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many Afro-Brazilians of the police will continue to discourage use of
the law.396
D. The Private Bar
A final institutional factor discouraging recourse to the courts
may be that the private bar does not offer a viable source of
representation for plaintiffs with discrimination claims. While private
counsel is readily available to plaintiffs in the labor courts, such
attorneys typically handle claims for severance payments, and may
not be equipped to attempt the more difficult litigation required to
establish employer liability for discriminatory practices.
Moreover, NGOs associated with the Black Movement have
generally petitioned the Public Ministry to bring class actions rather
than litigate on their own behalf.3" Within the Brazilian consumer
rights and environmental movements, legal advocacy-focused NGOs
have been established that litigate civil public actions in their own
right. However, Afro-Brazilian organizations pursuing similar
strategies are only now beginning to emerge.3" In the last ten years,
attorneys associated with the Black Movement have discussed the
potential for civil litigation to generate financial, but the Brazilian
legal system currently lacks the type of financial incentives to support
the development of an entrepreneurial class action bar. 99 Though
networks of attorneys concerned with the rights of Afro-Brazilians
have formed within state bar associations, pro bono practice by
private attorneys has only recently begun to be introduced in Brazil.
Despite these recent developments, the resources required to bring
such litigation may continue to be in short supply.&' °
E. Black Movement Success through Non-Legal Strategies
The relative lack of responsiveness to the issue of racial
discrimination within the country's legal system is particularly notable
in contrast to recent reversals of attitude toward this subject by other
institutions of the Brazilian state. Afro-Brazilian activists, through
396. Buckley, supra note 18, at A12.
397. Gomes, supra note 23, at 396, 400.
398. Adami, supra note 58; Cf. Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor,
<http://www.idec.org.br/> (visited Apr. 6, 2007), Instituto Socioambiental,
<http://www.socioambiental.org/> (visited Apr. 6, 2007).
399. Cottrol, supra note 129, at 75; Hernandez, supra note 84, at 1129.
400. Instituto Pro Bono, <http://www.institutoprobono.org.br> (visited May 1,
2007); Adami, supra note 58.
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strategic alliances with other social movements and skillful
engagement of the executive and legislature, have achieved
remarkable success in securing government policies aimed at
remedying racial inequality. This impressive progress suggests that
the Black Movement has chosen, perhaps wisely, to pursue reform
through policy channels, rather than through the courts.
However, these gains, though of significant value to the Afro-
Brazilian population, do not remedy the lack of effective legal
protection against racial discrimination in the private labor market.
Moreover, while it is clear that the Black Movement's successful
engagement of other state institutions has begun to influence the legal
system, its reform efforts have mixed implications for the further
development of Brazilian anti-discrimination law.
One sign of increasing responsiveness to this issue by the
Brazilian state has been the formation of government agencies
specifically tasked with defending the rights of Afro-Brazilians. First
established in the early 1990s in states with large Afro-Brazilian
populations like Rio de Janeiro, such bodies have been formed in
recent years at successively higher levels of the federal government,
and as increasingly permanent institutions.' After decades in which
the federal government treated racial inequality as a non-issue, the
Cardoso administration formed in 1996 an "Inter-ministerial Working
Group for the Valorization of the Black Population," and created
regional "Nuclei of Combating Discrimination and Promoting Equal
Opportunity" within the Ministry of Labor. Under the current Lula
government, a separate federal agency, the Secretariat for Promoting
Policies of Racial Inclusion ("SEPPIR"), has been created to
coordinate governmental initiatives in this area.0 3 Headed by Afro-
Brazilian activist Matilde Ribeiro, the secretariat possesses minimal
budget and staff, but its creation was significant to the Black
Movement as a symbol of the government's commitment to
addressing the issue of racial inequality. 4'
Of more concrete value has been the adoption of over 100
affirmative action programs in both employment and higher
education by a wide array of government institutions.' Created by
legislation and executive orders at the federal, state and municipal
401. Telles, supra note 10, at 48-9.
402. Id. at 54; Soares, supra note 53, at 81.
403. Telles, supra note 10, at 73-4.
404. Id.
405. Racusen, supra note 108, at 788.
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levels, these initiatives operate as straightforward quotas that reserve
a set proportion of jobs or university admissions for Afro-
Brazilians' 6 In the area of employment, most of these programs
cover only public sector workers, though some state agencies
extended their coverage to staff of government contractors as well.47
Given the importance of the state as an employer and purchaser of
services, these policies benefit Afro-Brazilian workers by expanding
employment opportunities in the public sector and by setting an
example for private firms. However, these measures provide little
concrete help to the majority of Afro-Brazilian workers whose work
is not connected to the state.
The most publicized of the affirmative action programs, and
those upon which the Black Movement has concentrated most of its
energy, address admissions to the country's public universities.4 0° This
is understandable since inequality in educational levels between white
and non-white Brazilians has been identified as the factor responsible
for the greatest share of racial disparities in income and
employment.4°  These programs address a widely recognized
injustice: the subsidization of free higher education for students from
wealthy families, who can afford the private preparatory schooling
necessary to pass the university entrance examinations, by a much
poorer taxpaying public whose children do not benefit from these
public institutions. 0 Standing alone, however, such programs will not
ensure that Afro-Brazilians who gain access to higher education
subsequently receive equal treatment in the job market. Indeed,
given that recent surveys indicate that racial disparities in earning
increase along with educational levels, such programs by themselves
are unlikely to close the economic gap between non-white and white
Brazilians.4
F. Black Movement Strategies and the Anti-discrimination Law
The recent success of the Black Movement in prodding the
Brazilian state to recognize and respond to the problem of racial
inequality has been attributed to the adoption of two important
406. Teiles, supra note 10, at 59-72.
407. Id. at 59-61.
408. Christopher Guillebeau, Affirmative Action in Global Perspective: The
Cases of South Africa and Brazil, 19 SOC. SPECTRUM 443,458 (1999).
409. Telles, supra note 10, at 141.
410. Gomes, supra note 23, at 401.
411. Roland, supra note 30, at 5.
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political strategies. Domestically, Black Movement organizations and
individual Afro-Brazilian activists have pursued an "entrist" strategy
within the political left, forming institutional alliances with, and
assuming leadership in, key sectors of Brazilian civil society, such as
the labor, human rights, housing and land reform movements. 42 This
has allowed the Black Movement to place the issue of racial
discrimination on the political agenda, notwithstanding the continued
preference on the left for class-based social policies.
Second, in extraordinarily skillful fashion, the Black Movement
has deployed the "naming and shaming" strategy of the global human
rights movement by bringing complaints against the government
before various international bodies, including the ILO, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the UN World
Congress Against Racism.43 By threatening Brazil's reputation as an
exemplar of racial harmony and tolerance, the Black Movement has
challenged one of the country's leading claims to moral authority in
international relations. As a result, the Brazilian government has
had to enter into direct dialogue with Afro-Brazilian activists
specifically around the question of racial discrimination. By situating
this conversation in an international setting, the Black Movement has
been able avoid having the issue subsumed in a broader discussion of
social inequality as so often has occurred in the domestic context.
Finally, by bringing the attention of international bodies to bear on
the issue of racial inequality in Brazil, the Black Movement has
allowed the state to frame the adoption of affirmative action and
other race-specific programs as necessary to meet the country's
international human rights commitments, instead of as a response to
domestic political pressure.415
While successful in bringing the issue of racial inequality into the
mainstream of Brazilian politics, these strategies have had a mixed
impact on the development of the country's anti-discrimination law.
The Black Movement's engagement of the executive and legislative
branches has produced laws that, if enforced, might provide
important statutory protections for the rights of the Afro-Brazilian
population. As discussed already, the past two decades have seen the
expansion of anti-discrimination protections in key fields of Brazilian
law, from the Constitution itself to the civil, labor and penal codes.
412. Telles, supra note 10, at 47-51, 64, 76.
413. Id. at 63-71.
414. Id.
415. Nascimento and Nascimento, supra note 32, at 138.
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But while this legislation is of considerable symbolic value, it has
limited practical usefulness in combating discrimination. Indeed,
veteran Afro-Brazilian activist Abdias do Nascimento has argued that
the importance of the anti-discrimination laws is not in their actual
enforceability, but instead in their rhetorical value - as a tool for
pushing the state to take seriously the policy commitments they
embody.416 From this perspective, the Black Movement's focus on
affirmative action can be understood as an attempt to push the state
to give substantive content to the anti-discrimination legislation of the
late 1990s. Such a strategy makes particular sense in the Brazilian
context, where the autonomy of the Public Ministry means that the
executive has rather limited ability to enforce laws on its own.
However, the use of anti-discrimination law as a symbolic tool
may further delay the development of more effective methods of
challenging racial discrimination through the courts themselves. As
displaced white applicants challenge affirmative action programs -
which has already occurred in the context of higher education - the
legal resources of both the Public Ministry and the Black Movement
may be devoted to protecting these gains.1 7 It Seems likely that use of
anti-discrimination law to protect the rights of Afro-Brazilians in the
private sector necessarily will have to take a back seat to defending
Brazil's nascent affirmative action programs against such challenges.
The lack of responsiveness of legal institutions to the problem of
racial discrimination has contributed significantly to the
underdevelopment of Brazil's anti-discrimination law. Whether from
resistance, reluctance or lack of capacity, or because they are more
insulated from the forms of influence the Black Movement brought to
bear on other institutions, the Brazilian legal system does not appear
to have experienced a similar shift in its treatment of racial
discrimination. This inertia has persisted in spite of the enactment of
significant new anti-discrimination measures and increasingly greater
attention to these issues by both public prosecutors and the private
bar. As a result, the Black Movement has chosen to use the law as an
instrument of political advocacy outside of the courts, but may be
delaying the development of an anti-discrimination law that will
better serve the needs of Afro-Brazilian workers.
416. Id. at 139.
417. Telles, supra note 10, at 74; Adami, supra note 58.
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VII. Conclusion
While the Brazilian legal system has not made the dramatic shift
in its approach towards racial discrimination that the country's other
political institutions have undertaken in recent years, it would be
premature to conclude that the law is unlikely become a viable route
for Afro-Brazilians to achieve fair treatment in the workplace. On
the contrary, when one considers each of the key factors that have
influenced the development of Brazilian anti-discrimination law, one
can see significant changes that may well pave the way for more
effective use of the law in combating racial discrimination. At the
same time, even if the Black Movement achieves broader success in
opening educational and employment opportunities for Afro-
Brazilians, the need for more effective legal protection against
discrimination in the workplace will only become more pressing.
Given the dramatic progress that the Black Movement has made
recently on other fronts, it is hard to believe that success for Afro-
Brazilian workers in the courts will remain an "exception to the rule."
First, it is clear that the ideology of racial democracy holds
declining sway in the country's public life. Nearly 90 percent of the
population now recognizes the existence of significant discrimination
against Afro-Brazilians, particularly in the labor market and criminal
justice system."8 Additionally, the Brazilian government has broken
with its past and no longer denies that racial discrimination is a
problem requiring remedial state action. 9
The end of racial democracy's ideological hegemony creates an
opening in Brazilian legal thought for the re-conceptualization of
racial discrimination, its varied expressions and effects. Freed of a
narrow formulation of racial discrimination as a foreign phenomenon
that shows itself only in the most blatant forms of prejudice,
legislators, litigators and judges can construct an anti-discrimination
law that extends its reach to less visible forms of discrimination that
nonetheless constrain the prospects of Afro-Brazilian workers. A
trend towards such broader thinking can already be glimpsed in
changes in the statutory law, litigation strategies pursued by plaintiffs
and public prosecutors, and the recent jurisprudence of the courts.
One concrete and fundamental change is the strategic shift by
Afro-Brazilians away from reliance on the criminal provisions of the
anti-discrimination law toward civil litigation as a strategy to secure
418. Fry, supra note 95, at 188.
419. Telles, supra note 10, at 16.
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justice in the courts. This has already produced a number of
successful verdicts that are likely to further embolden legal advocates
and potential plaintiffs. Moreover, in the field of legislative reform,
one can recognize similar change in emphasis, away from attempts to
strengthen criminal penalties for 'racism' and toward the enactment
of stronger civil protections and remedies for Afro-Brazilian workers.
While some elements of the Brazilian judiciary continue to resist
expanding the liability of employers for racial discriminatory acts,
signs of change in its jurisprudence are increasingly apparent. In
several recent cases judges in the labor courts have awarded damages
to Afro-Brazilians employees for racially abusive treatment by co-
workers and supervisors. The TST's historic decisions regarding the
right of Afro-Brazilian workers to redress in cases of discriminatory
discharge also represent important signs of national progress in
dealing with issues of race.4 20
Another marker of change may be the composition of the courts
themselves. The last 10 years have seen the appointment of the first
Afro-Brazilian members to both the Federal Supreme Court and the
TST. In a judiciary of career civil servants, change may come more
slowly to the lower courts. Nevertheless, it seems likely that, over
time, affirmative action programs in higher education should lead to
greater judicial diversity.
As the Black Movement continues to succeed in pressing the
state to expand educational and employment opportunities for Afro-
Brazilians, the need for more effective protections against racial
discrimination in employment will only become greater. Afro-
Brazilians who benefit from these reforms are likely to face
discrimination by those who resist their entrance into non-traditional
roles. Moreover, in a labor law regime where many statutory
protections are enforced either not at all or only after an employee's
termination, action through the courts will be necessary to ensure that
the recent amendments to the labor code actually "take hold" with
Brazilian employers.421
In the Brazilian debate over affirmative action, its proponents
are often charged with inappropriately implanting a North American
policy in a context to which it is ill-suited due to Brazil's more fluid
420. Press Release, Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, Vantuil: S6 a conscientizaqao
pode eliminar o racismo, (Nov. 17, 2005), available at <http://www.tst.gov.br/>.
421. Rosenn, supra note 161, at 22.
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color lines.4 2  Strengthening Brazilian anti-discrimination law,
however, does not require the importation of new methods from
abroad, but instead can take advantage of already available tools in
the domestic legal order.
As Hddio Silva has suggested, the incorporation of ILO Convention
111 into Brazilian constitutional law provides grounds for imposing
"objective liability" based on the racially disparate impact of
employer practices. 23 Moreover, in age and gender bias cases
Brazilian courts already employ a form of burden shifting analysis
that readily could be applied in cases involving racial discrimination.
Similarly, amendments to existing provisions of the Labor Code
might further facilitate the use of the labor courts to challenge racial
discrimination. In order to reduce the risk to individual plaintiffs, the
Labor Code's anti-retaliation provisions, which currently extend only
to workers exercising parental leave or holding positions as union
stewards or health and safety officers, could be extended to
employees with discrimination claims. Another option might be to
add anti-retaliation protections to Law 9.029, which already offers
reinstatement or liquidated damages for victims of discriminatory
termination.
It seems unlikely that the Public Ministry alone can adequately
enforce the new antidiscrimination provisions of the Labor Code
without some assistance from private litigants. Some of the
advantages Public Prosecutors enjoy in establishing standing and
compelling discovery might in class actions be extended to trade
unions and NGOs to better enable these groups to bring such suits
themselves. Similarly, in the labor courts, where trade unions are
otherwise well-positioned to bring class actions challenging
discrimination, it seems reasonable that some of the existing barriers
to their standing in such cases be relaxed. If a Black Movement NGO
can file a suit without showing that a majority of Afro-Brazilian
citizens in a particular community are in favor of it, why should a
trade union have to seek approval of its general membership before
bringing a class action on behalf of a sub-group of Afro-Brazilian
workers?
The work of the Public Ministry also might be complemented by
the institutional development of new non-governmental entities that
specialize in litigating this type of case. Such organizations already
422. Rochetti, supra note 24, at 1458.
423. Silva, supra note 76, at 379.
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exist in Brazil's consumer and environmental fields. Additionally,
assistance could be sought from the committees that recently have
been formed to address racial issues within the Brazilian state bar
associations. While organized pro bono practice is only beginning to
be established in Brazil, cooperation in bringing discrimination claims
may be a fruitful area of collaboration amoig prosecutors, NGOs and
the private bar.
After nearly four decades of virtual stasis, Brazilian
antidiscrimination law appears to be entering a period of significant
change. Broader recognition of racial discrimination as a significant
problem in Brazilian society means that the legal system increasingly
will be held accountable for failing to offer a viable means of redress.
At the same time, those seeking to combat racial discrimination,
particularly in the field of employment, are likely to pursue the more
promising path of civil litigation, rather than seeking criminal
prosecution. Though obvious obstacles to effective deterrence and
fair redress persist, it is equally clear that in Brazil racial
discrimination can no longer be considered an area where "the law
[does] not have a role to assume.,
424
424. Medeiros, supra note 81, at 99.
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